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DISTRIBUTOR TERMINATIONS PURSUANT
TO CONSPIRACIES AMONG
A SUPPLIER AND COMPLAINING
DISTRIBUTORS: A
SUGGESTED ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr. t
Distributor termination cases are among the most actively litigated
areas of antitrust today.1 Antitrust claims have become "an almost re-
flexive response' 2 of terminated distributors who, faced with certain
damages from the loss of a particular product, and in some cases, the
complete failure of their businesses, 3 lack valid contract or tort claims
against their suppliers.4 These distributors frequently allege that their
termination was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act5 because it
was effected pursuant to an agreement among their supplier and one or
more other distributors seeking to avoid competition with the termi-
nated distributor. As evidence of an illegal agreement, the terminated
distributor may cite other distributors' complaints to the supplier about
the terminated distributor's price-cutting, territorial incursions, or other
aggressive competition. Courts have had difficulty resolving two issues
raised by these allegations: (1) whether a conspiracy may be inferred
from the supplier's receipt of the distributors' complaints; and
(2) whether such a conspiracy should be characterized as horizontal or
vertical conduct.
The issue of conspiracy arises because unilateral refusals to deal are
not illegal under section 1. In United States v. Colgate & Co. ,6 the
Supreme Court held that a supplier may unilaterally refuse to deal with
a customer for any reason it deems fit without violating section 1.
t Member, Ohio State Bar. B.A. 1971, Allegheny College; J.D. 1974, Cornell Law
School.
1 Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53
TEXAS L. REv. 1180, 1212 (1975).
2 Halverson, Franchisor-Franchisee Relationshi:ps-Antitr Considerations, 47 ANTITRUST
LJ. 869, 897 (1979).
3 Bartlit, PracticalProblm in Teminating Distributors andDealers, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 317,
318 (1974).
4 See Bohling, supra note 1, at 1181-82; Halverson, supra note 2, at 897; Horton, Legal
Remedies of Distributor Terminated Pursuant to Contractual Provision for Termination Upon Notice, 3
CREIGHTON L. REv. 88 (1970).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("Every contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal.").
6 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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Courts have had difficulty, however, distinguishing legitimate unilateral
conduct from illegal conspiracies among a supplier and its distributors
to terminate a competing distributor.7 This distinction is particularly
difficult when the only evidence of the alleged conspiracy is the sup-
plier's receipt of the distributors' complaints about the competitive ac-
tivity of the terminated distributor. In such cases, many courts have
been reluctant to infer an illegal conspiracy because the supplier may
have been motivated to effect the termination by business reasons in-
dependent of the complaints.8
In those cases in which a termination conspiracy between a supplier
and one or more of its distributors has been inferred, courts have been
uncertain whether to apply the rule of reason or the per se rule. This
uncertainty derives from the fact that such conspiracies have both hori-
zontal and vertical elements. The actual termination of the distributor
is imposed vertically by the supplier, yet the inducement for the termi-
nation may come horizontally from the complaining competitors of the
terminated distributor. Thus, although the form of such a "mixed ter-
mination" 9 conspiracy may be vertical, the competitive purpose and ef-
fect of the conspiracy is more similar to horizontal conspiracies that
exclude competitors of the conspirators from a market. Concentrating
on the vertical form rather than the horizontal competitive substance of
mixed termination conspiracies, many courts have mechanically applied
the rule of reason when the per se rule would have been more
appropriate. ' 0
This Article proposes a new method for analyzing the legality of
alleged conspiracies among a supplier and complaining distributors to
terminate a competing distributor." The proposed analysis,. which fo-
7 See notes 78-87 and accompanying text infia. Some courts and commentators have
concluded that in order to come under the Colgate doctrine, the facts of a particular case must
be of "such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enter-
prise." George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960); see Comment, An Examination of Doric Simplicity: The Criteia of the Decision to Cease Busi-
ness Relations, 10 VILL. L. REv. 117 (1964).
8 See notes 77-87 and accompanying text infra.
9 The term "mixed termination" describes a suppliers termination of a distributor
upon the alleged urging of a competing distributor.
10 See notes 52-68 and accompanying text infra.
11 This Article is confined to a discussion of the legality of such terminations under § I
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Attempts to monopolize under § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), although potentially an issue in termination cases, are analyzed in a completely differ-
ent manner from agreements under § 1. See note 32 infra. This Article does not discuss other
antitrust provisions that are potentially applicable to distributor terminations because they
are not likely to apply to terminations effected pursuant to agreements among a supplier and
its distributors. Terminations challenged under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976),
for example, are confined by the statutory language to instances in which a supplier "con-
tract[s] for [the] sale of. . . commodities. . . on the condition. . . that the. . . purchaser
thereof shall not. . . deal in the. . . commodities of a competitor.. . of the [supplier]." Id.
Such restrictions generally benefit suppliers, not distributors. Therefore, such restrictions
[Vol. 67:297
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cuses on the supplier's motive in terminating the distributor, should sim-
plify the task of judging whether a conspiracy in fact exists in a given
case and should ensure that the competitive substance, rather than the
mere form, of such a conspiracy determines whether a vertical or hori-
zontal analysis is applied.
I
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
CONDUCT
Courts have traditionally distinguished horizontal and vertical con-
spiracies on the basis of their different competitive effects. Generally,
horizontal restraints have been found pernicious enough to be per se
illegal, while non-price vertical restraints have either been analyzed
under the rule of reason to consider their possible procompetitive effects
or upheld as unilateral conduct under Colgate. This distinction indicates
that the antitrust treatment of mixed termination conspiracies should
vary depending upon whether the horizontal or vertical aspects of such
conspiracies predominate. The per se rule should apply if horizontal
aspects predominate and, barring resale price maintenance,12 either the
rule of reason or the Colgate defense should apply if the vertical aspects
of the conspiracy are predominant. 13
A. Horirontal Restraints: The Per Se Rule
Courts apply the per se rule to agreements that have been found in
the great majority of instances to have only an anticompetitive purpose
and effect. 14 Such agreements are viewed as so plainly pernicious that
their mere existence proves their illegality "without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use." 15 Per se rules are generally adopted only after judicial experience
has indicated that a particular type of restraint will rarely, if ever, sur-
should not be the basis for an alleged conspiracy among a supplier and its distributors to
terminate another distributor. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text infla. Subsection
(a)(5) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45(a) (1976), does not apply to
distributors allegedly terminated pursuant to mixed horizontal/vertical agreements, because
the Act makes no provision for private suits, and the courts have consistently refused to imply
a private cause of action. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987-94
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting arguments for judicial implication of a private cause of action after
analysis of legislative history and policy considerations); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d
279, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1973).
12 Resale price-fixing agreements are ordinarily analyzed under the per se rule. See Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Son, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See generally note 42 and
accompanying text inra.
13 See notes 14-48 and accompanying text infra.
14 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (per se rule
applies to "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition").
15 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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vive a complete economic analysis.' 6 Once established, per se rules re-
duce the time and expense of antitrust litigation, 17 effectively deter
anticompetitive conduct, 18 and promote accuracy and certainty in deci-
sionmaking. 19 These advantages justify the application of the rule in
the small minority of cases in which the challenged conduct might
otherwise be deemed proper after a full inquiry into its competitive
effects. 20
Courts have determined that agreements that directly restrict ac-
tual or potential competition among the parties to the agreement are
pernicious enough to justify per se treatment. For example, both hori-
zontal price-fixing 2 ' and horizontal divisions of customers or territories22
have been held per se illegal. These horizontal agreements have such
serious and obvious anticompetitive effects that no consideration of their
possible advantages or justifications is necessary.2 3 Indeed, as several
courts have noted, such agreements usually have no purpose or effect
16 Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (noting, in case
of first impression, the "need to know more. . . about the actual impact of these [vertical]
arrangements" before applying per se analysis) with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967) (applying per se analysis to vertical arrangements following addi-
tional judicial experience).
- 17 See Note, Concerted Refisals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARv. L. REV.
1531, 1535 (1958). See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972)
(per se rule allows courts to avoid rambling "through the wilds of economic theory").
18 See Bauer, Per Se Illegalitp of Concerted Refurals to Deal, A Rule Ripe for Re-examination, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 685, 695 (1979).
19 See id.
20 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977); North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("Cases that do not fit the generalization
may arise, but aper se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common
or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.').
21 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply
Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d
563 (2d Cir. 1961). Before Topco, all horizontal market division cases decided by the Supreme
Court involved ancillary price restraints. Topco, however, involved horizontal market division
without any ancillary price-fixing, and the Court indicated that such restraints may be per se
illegal. 405 U.S. at 609 n.9. Several commentators have concluded that horizontal market
division is as great an evil as horizontal price-fixing. See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13, 30-31 (1978); Pos-
ner, Antitrust Polio, and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the RestrictedDistributionHorizontalMerger
and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 282, 292 (1975); Comment, Restricted
Distribution After ' chw,'m," 9 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 1032, 1040-41 (1968); Comment,
Vertical Arrangements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92
HARv. L. Rav. 1160, 1163 (1979).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco involved
territorial and customer restrictions among distributors of a single product brand. The Court
held that the elimination of intrabrand competition among the distributors was sufficiently
pernicious to justify application of the per se rule and that consideration of possible beneficial
effects on interbrand competition was unnecessary. Id. at 611-12.
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other than to suppress competition.24
If agreements by which competitors fix prices or divide territories
among themselves in order to avoid competition with each other are per
se illegal, then conspiracies by such firms to exclude other actual or po-
tential competitors from their market should be no less illegal. Like
agreements to fix prices or allocate territories, such horizontal agree-
ments have no purpose other than to restrict competition. The effective-
ness of such an agreement often depends upon the conspirators' ability
to enlist a firm at a different competitive level to use its market power to
enforce the exclusion of a competitor.25 Accordingly, courts have held
that it is per se illegal for competitors to combine to induce their sup-
plier to participate in a "group boycott" of their actual or potential
competitors. In United States v. General Motors Corp. ,26 for example, the
Supreme Court applied the per se rule when a group of automobile
dealers induced General Motors to prohibit contractually its dealers
from selling to discounters who competed with the group. Because Gen-
eral Motors initially imposed and later enforced the contractual restric-
tion, the dealers' horizontal conspiracy to exclude discounters from the
market was even more effective than it would have been without the
supplier's participation. 27
The group boycott principle also applies when a single customer
induces a group of suppliers to enter into a horizontal agreement not to
deal with a competing customer. In K/or's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc. ,28 a retailer induced certain appliance manufacturers and distribu-
tors to sell to a competing retailer only at discriminatorily high prices.
The Court applied the per se rule because the effective elimination of
the competing retailer's sources of supply also eliminated any competi-
tion between the two retailers in the appliance market. 29 Under the
24 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States v. Scaly,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1966); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963);
Ohio-Scaly Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Scaly, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291
F.2d 563, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1961).
25 See Buxbaum, Boycotts and Restietive Marketing Arrangements, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 671,
674-75 (1966):
[A]n economic boycott requires the cooperation of a party at a different level
in the distribution process from that on which the instigators operate. Even
though members of an industry wish to punish or eliminate a certain competi-
tor, they can do so only by inducing the competitor's customers or suppliers to
stop dealing with him.
See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 148 (1977).
26 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
27 Id. at 144.
28 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
29 The term "group boycott" describes three basic types of horizontal combinations
designed to exclude firms from a market or to coerce them into observing trade practices
favored by the members of the combination. Although each type of group boycott takes a
1982]
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precedent of the group boycott cases, therefore, the per se rule should
apply whenever one or more distributors induce a supplier to terminate
or refuse to deal with any of their actual or potential competitors. 30
B. Vertical Restraints: The Colgate Defense and the Rule of Reason
Cases involving vertical conduct indicate that in the absence of re-
sale price-fixing,3' the per se rule should not apply to terminations im-
posed by a supplier independently of his distributors. Such terminations
either should be valid as unilateral conduct under Colgate32 or accorded
a full economic analysis under the rule of reason. The Colgate defense
would apply in those rare situations in which a supplier makes an in-
dependent decision not to deal with a distributor and no agreement to
different form, the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule in each case because of the
severe anticompetitive consequences effected by the pooling of the conspirators' market
power. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966).
The first type of group boycott involves conspiracies among firms at different competi-
tive levels to exclude from a particular market other firms competing with one or more of the
conspirators. See, e.g., id.; Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Six
Twenty-Nine Prods. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 483-85 (5th Cir. 1966).
The second type of per se illegal group boycott involves broad horizontal conspiracies of
firms at the same competitive level to exclude direct competitors. See Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (Stock Exchange members collectively refused to approve
telephone connections essential to over-the-counter broker-dealers' business); Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (trade association refused to
approve gas burners manufactured by a competitor of association's members); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (press association prohibited its members from fur-
nishing news to non-members and allowed members to block competitors' membership appli-
cations); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(retailers conspired to refuse to deal with wholesalers who made direct sales to consumers in
competition with retailers).
The third type of per se illegal group boycott involves horizontal conspiracies of suppliers
designed to induce customers to engage in trade practices favored by the suppliers. See
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joesph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (liquor manufac-
turers' collective refusal to sell to price-cutting wholesalers); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (fashion designers' refusal to sell to retailers who
purchased and sold copies of original designs).
Group boycotts of the first type, in which firms at different competitive levels pool their
market power to exclude firms from a particular market, are most similar in competitive
purpose and effect to mixed termination conspiracies. Therefore, the references in this Article
to "group boycott" cases encompass only this first type of group boycott.
30 See notes 88-96, 104 and accompanying text infra.
31 See note 42 and accompanying text infta.
32 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see text accompanying note 6
supra. The Colgate Court held that a unilateral refusal to deal does not constitute an illegal
contract, combination, or conspiracy within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 250 U.S. at 307. If, however, a supplier has a specific intent to achieve a
monopoly in a particular market and there is a dangerous probability that the refusal to deal
will allow the supplier to obtain the monopoly, § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976),
may prohibit a unilateral refusal to deal. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,
273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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refuse to deal can be inferred.3 3 In the more frequent case of a distribu-
tor termination pursuant to an express or implied vertical agreement,
the termination should be judged by the rule of reason, provided that
resale price maintenance is not an objective of the agreement.
The Supreme Court's approach to non-price vertical contract re-
33 The Colgate defense has been severely limited in cases in which agreements to main-
tain resale prices have been implied from coercive conduct apeparing on its face to be unilat-
eral. The readiness with which courts have implied such agreements has caused one
commentator to conclude that the defense is "almost entirely illusory." Turner, The Defmition
of Agreement Under the Shennan Ac!: Conscous Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV.
655, 685 (1962). Indeed, courts have implied an agreement under § 1 when suppliers have
engaged in any conduct beyond an expressed disinterest in selling to a discounter. For exam-
pIe, courts have implied resale price-fixing agreements when a supplier has directly
threatened a distributor with termination, direct competition, or retaliation from others for
failure to observe resale prices. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (newspaper
publisher began to compete with independent carrier of its papers to secure carrier's compli-
ance with suggested retail prices); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (man-
ufacturer enforced resale price recommendations with special agents, blacklists, and refusals
to sell); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980) (gasoline distributor coerced its
dealers into complying with its pricing policy by threats of lease termination). These deci-
sions appear to be based upon an implicit recognition that the seller's coercive conduct would
have convinced the distributor to resume reselling "subject to the tacit or implied understand-
ing that [he] will toe the pricing line." See In re Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1981 ANTrrRusT
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1008, at F-1. Some courts have even found that the business
setting itself may create a coercive environment that induces a tacit resale price understand-
ing. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (car
muffler franchisee, dependent on supplier for livelihood, made aware of supplier's policy of
terminating franchisees who did nt observe certain resale prices). Courts have also implied
resale price-fixing agreements in cases in which the supplier has enlisted customers at one
competitive level to police or coerce adherence to resale prices by customers at another com-
petitive level. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (manufacturer
threatened to withhold deliveries from wholesalers unless they policed minimum prices of
retailers); United State v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (optical distribu-
tor required assistance of wholesalers in setting prices and approving retailers). The Court
justified its findings of conspiracy in Parke, Davis and Bausch & Lomb on the ground that an
agreement existed among the supplier and the "policing" customers to engage in a general
program ofresale price maintenance. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 45-
46; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. at 723.
Although one commentator recently concluded that "[r]elatively little is left of the [Col-
gate] doctrine," Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrt Treatment of Restricted Dirtributio " Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 6, 23 n.62 (1981), the doctrine remains viable in cases in which
the supplier has taken no action beyond a simple unilateral refusal to deal. See, e.g., Garrett's,
Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 412 F. Supp. 656 (D.S.C. 1976) (upholding refusal to sell to price-
cutter in absence of coercion by supplier or other parties enlisted by supplier); Graham v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), a jdprcuiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d
Cir. 1965). The Third Circuit recently cited Colgate as authority for the "law's traditional
tolerance of unilateral decisions on the part of a manufacturer," Cernuto, Inc. v. United
Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1979), and an administrative law judge recently
reaffirmed the Colgate doctrine in dismissing a complaint that had been intended to lead to an
express overruling of the doctrine. See In re Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1981 ANTrrRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1008 at F-1 (unilateral refusal to deal with discounter not
illegal under § 1). The persistence of the "somewhat hallowed notion" that a company acting
unilaterally has the right to choose with whom it will deal also illustrates the continued viabil-
ity of the Colgate doctrine. Se, e.g., Bauer, supra note 18, at 697.
1982]
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strictions has come full circle since White Motor Co. v. United States,34 in
which the Court held that it had insufficient experience from which to
judge such restrictions per se illegal. The Court subsequently held in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 35 that the per se rule should apply
to all territorial or customer restraints imposed on a distributor after the
supplier "parted with dominion" over the product. 36 Severely criticized
by the commentators37 and distinguished by the lower courts, 38 Schwinn
finally was overruled in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,39 in
which the Court returned the rule of reason to non-price vertical con-
tract restrictions.
The Court based its holding in GTE Sylvania on a belief that non-
price resale restrictions attractive to distributors seeking to avoid in-
trabrand competition might induce "competent and aggressive" firms to
invest in a supplier's distributorships, to engage in promotional activi-
ties, and to provide service and repair facilities.40 Such effects presuma-
bly would increase the supplier's effectiveness in competing against
other brands.4 1 The Court concluded that the rule of reason should be
34 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
35 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
36 Id. at 382.
37 See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review--1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667
(1967); Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1968);
Posner, supra note 22; Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 243
(1975). But see Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument
for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Aproach, 75 MicH. L. REv. 275 (1976).
38 See, e.g., World of Sleep, Inc. v. Steams & Foster Co., 525 F.2d 40, 44-45 (10th Cir.
1975); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976);
Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 1974); Colo-
rado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.), cere. denied,
393 U.S. 938 (1968). One commentator described this avoidance of the Schwinn per se rule as
"a tribute to judicial ingenuity." Robinson, supra note 37, at 272.
39 433 U.S. 36 (1977). GTESylvania involved a manufacturer's termination of a retailer
who had violated its distributor contract by reselling the manufacturer's product from an
unauthorized location. The Court, rejecting the retailer's contention that the territorial limi-
tation was a per se violation of § 1, held that the rule of reason should apply because the
limitation's procompetitive effect on interbrand competition might outweigh its adverse im-
pact on intrabrand competition.
40 433 U.S. at 54-55. Commentators generally have viewed measures designed to pro-
tect distributors against intrabrand competition from "cream skimmers" or "free riders" seek-
ing to capitalize on the distributors' promotional efforts as legitimate means of inducing
distributors to make adequate investments in personnel and facilities and to engage in aggres-
sive promotional activities. See, e.g., Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Anal-
ysis and Public Poliy Standards, 30 LAw & CoNTEp. PROBS. 506, 511 (1965); Zelek, Stem &
Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Deciion ModelAfter Sylvania, 68 CAUF. L. REv. 13, 16 (1980).
41 433 U.S. at 55-56. The GTE Sylvania Court also relied on the theory that the eco-
nomic interests of suppliers instituting resale restrictions would cause them to retain as much
intrabrand competition as possible. Id. See general Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept Price Fixing andMarket Division, 75 YALE LJ. 373, 403 (1966); Posner, supra note 22, at
283-84. Commentators have noted the GTE Sylvania Court's recognition that, when a sup-
plier imposes vertical restrictions on distribution, its interest in retaining adequate competi-
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used to balance such positive interbrand effects against the negative ef-
fects of non-price vertical restraints on intrabrand competition. 42
Courts and commentators have enthusiastically endorsed GTE Syl-
vania's application of the rule of reason to non-price vertical restraints.43
Although only a vertical location clause was directly at issue in GTE
Sylvania, 4 subsequent decisions have made it clear that the Court's rea-
soning extends to other non-price restrictions on resale.45
tion within its own distribution system "will produce less anticompetitive effects than if the
same restrictions were adopted by the dealers themselves." Pitofsky, supra note 22, at 10. See
also Posner, supra note 33, at 23.
42 The Court retained the per se rule for resale price-fixing. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. Subse-
quent decisions have referred to price restraints as the only vertical resale restriction that is
still subject to the per se rule. See, e.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
572 F.2d 953, 960 (2d Cir. 1978). Indeed, courts have consistently applied the per se rule to
resale price-fixing since the early case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911), and the per se illegality of resale price maintenance was recently reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alumi-
num, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980) (dictum). The application of the per se rule to resale price
coercion appearing on its face to be unilateral has severely impinged upon the Colgate doc-
trine. Under current law, it appears that a supplier may announce and observe a policy of
refusing to deal with price-cutters. If, however, the supplier attempts to secure customers'
adherence to resale prices by terminations, threats of terminations, or otherwise, he has com-
mitted a per se violation of§ 1. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 719
(S.D.N.Y.), afd per caiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969); South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
237 F. Supp. 650, 653-54 (N.D. Ill. 1965). See generally note 33 supra.
Although retaining the per se rule for resale price-fixing, the GTE Sylvania Court con-
cluded that the rule of reason should be used to balance the positive interbrand effects against
the negative intrabrand effects of all other vertical restrictions on distribution. 433 U.S. at 57.
When the supplier is a monopolist, however, there is no interbrand competition that would
figure in the balancing test. Some commentators therefore suggest that the GTE Sylvania rule
of reason approach should not apply when monopolists impose non-price resale restrictions.
Instead, they argue, such restrictions should be per se illegal. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 22,
at 35. But see Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977) (upholding
territorial restrictions imposed by monopolist newspaper on home sales dealers where plaintiff
made no showing that dealers wanted to compete).
43 The commentators have significantly amplified GTE Sylvania's original list of possible
procompetitive justifications for non-price vertical restraints. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 22,
at 25-26 (allowing dealers to achieve economies of scale); Turner, supra note 33, at 699 (pre-
GTE Sylvania) (inducing dealers to develop local markets more aggressively); Zelek, Stem &
Dunfee, supra note 40, at 16 n.20 (ensuring that no single distributor becomes overly domi-
nant). Some commentators, however, have argued that the GTESylvania rule of reason analy-
sis should not apply to certain non-price vertical restraints. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 22, at
8-9 (per se rule should apply to "airtight" territorial allocations).
44 433 U.S. at 38.
45 See Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount Center, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1123 (6th Cir. 1979)
(dictum) (GTE.ylvania applies to all non-price vertical restraints); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.,
585 F.2d 381, 387 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); National Auto Brokers
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 960 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying GTE Sylvania to
allotment system under which each dfstributor assured of specified mfnimum number of cars
for resale); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.)
(territorial limitations), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Mer-
chandise Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (territorial, customer, and location
limitations); Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (field-
of-use restrictions on patented products).
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If a supplier independently decides to terminate a distributor for
violating a territorial, customer, or other non-price restriction in its dis-
tribution agreement, GTE Slvania would require that a court engage in
a rather prolonged and complicated economic analysis of the termina-
tion under the rule of reason.46 The termination would be illegal only if
the court determined that the anticompetitive effects of the distributor's
elimination from the intrabrand market outweighed the procompetitive
interbrand effects of a restriction allowing the supplier to attract aggres-
sive distributors. 47 Because it would be easier for the supplier to demon-
strate possible procompetitive interbrand effects than for the terminated
distributor to prove an adverse impact upon intrabrand competition,
the supplier would be much more likely to prevail in such a case.
Thus, the ultimate outcome of cases in which distributor termina-
tions allegedly have been induced by the complaints of other distribu-
tors often will depend on whether the court characterizes the challenged
conduct as vertical or horizontal.48 If the court views the termination as
having been imposed vertically by the supplier, the termination is likely
to be upheld either as unilateral conduct under Colgate or as a reason-
able method of promoting interbrand competition under GTE Sylvania.
If, on the other hand, the court views the termination as the product of a
horizontal conspiracy among complaining distributors, it will most
likely declare the termination illegal under the rationale of the group
boycott cases.
II
THE FAILURE OF ANALYSIS IN MIXED TERMINATION
CASES
Terminations induced by complaining distributors often do not fit
conveniently into a horizontal or vertical mold. Consequently, many
courts have had difficulty applying the precedent of the pure horizontal
and vertical cases to such terminations. In attempting to apply this pre-
cedent, courts have frequently focused on the apparent form of mixed
termination conspiracies. For example, courts have applied the rule of
reason to termination conspiracies involving only a single supplier and a
single competing distributor because such conspiracies appear vertical
46 433 U.S. at 59.
47 Id. at 49. The complicated nature of the analysis usually required under the rule of
reason has generated criticism of the rule. See Louis, supra note 37, at 277-78 (courts' alleged
inability to engage effectively and consistently in balancing test required under rule of rea-
son); McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Bices and Refis-
als to Deal, 37 ANTrrRUST L.J. 137, 144 (1967) (bulky and protracted proceedings required to
apply rule of reason); Pitofsky, sufra note 22, at 2 (vagueness of rule of reason provides little
deterrent effect).
48 The GTE Sylvania Court specifically recognized the need to distinguish horizontal
from vertical restrictions. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
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in form.49 On the other hand, when a supplier has retained the right to
compete with its distributors in the resale of its product, courts have
applied the per se rule, because the conspiracy appeared to take the
form of a horizontal agreement among competitors. 50 Although lending
a superficial consistency to mixed termination cases, such an analysis
has, in fact, resulted in frequent misapplication of the rule of reason and
the per se rule. The analysis also has led courts to impose unnecessary
restrictions on the fact-finder's consideration of a terminated distribu-
tor's prima facie case.5 '
A. Overuse of the Rule of Reason
When mixed termination conspiracies involve only one supplier
and a single distributor, thereby lacking the horizontal form of a classic
group boycott, courts often mechanically apply the rule of reason on the
basis of the apparent vertical form of the conspiracies. Courts have thus
overlooked the possible applicability of the per se rule to distributor ter-
minations actually induced by a single competing distributor. This ef-
fect has been most evident in the "exclusive distributor" and "horizontal
plurality" cases.
1. The Exclusive Distriibutor Cases
Under the rule of reason, courts traditionally have upheld a sup-
plier's refusal to deal with one distributor motivated by the grant of an
exclusive distributorship to an actual or potential competitor.52 Because
the refusal to deal in such cases is not induced by a conspiracy of com-
petitors, courts have concluded that the per se rule could not be applied
under the precedent of the group boycott cases. In many of the exclu-
sive distributor cases, application of the rule of reason has been justified
by the likelihood that the supplier's refusal to deal was the result of an
independent decision about the overall nature of its distribution sys-
tem.53 In other cases, however, courts have automatically upheld exclu-
sive distributorships when a further inquiry might have revealed that
the exclusive distributor induced the supplier to refuse to deal with an
actual or potential competitor. Some courts, for example, have upheld a
49 See notes 52-62 and accompanying text in/ra.
50 See notes 69-72 and accompanying text in/ia.
51 See notes 77-79 and accompanying text infra.
52 See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899
(D. Md.), af'd per acniam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). See
generally Elias, Dealer Tennination or Exclusion, Intrabrand Competition and GTE Sylvania, 29 BAY-
LOR L. Rav. 435, 436-37 (1977).
53 The establishment of an exclusive distributor in a particular territory does appear on
its face to be a decision that a supplier would make independently in planning its distribution
system. See notes 146-48 and accompanying text infra.
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distributor termination induced by an existing distributor who was sub-
sequently awarded an exclusive distributorship.54 Other courts have ap-
proved a new distributor's successful solicitation of his replacement of a
previous exclusive distributor.55 A few courts have even upheld an ex-
clusive distributor's outright veto of the appointment of additional dis-
tributors.56 Under the rationale employed in such cases, the per se rule
54 See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-34 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978) (supplier's termination of distributor and appointment of another
retailer as exclusive distributor held reasonable in absence of evidence of anticompetitive pur-
pose or effect); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957) (supplier's termination of two dealers and appointment
of third as exclusive distributor at inducement of third dealer held reasonable in view of
continued interbrand competition). See also Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts., Inc.,
587 F.2d 127, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1978) (court applied rule of reason where grocery store lessee at
shopping center exercised right under lease to compel landlord to terminate lease of another
grocer already in competition with lessee); Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil
Co., 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962) (rule of reason applied to contract clause granting gas
station exclusive right to operate in shopping center).
55 See Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093, 1094 (3d Cir. 1972)
(upholding replacement of existing distributor with subsidiary of parent supplier); Comment,
Vertical Agreements to Tenninate Competing Distributor: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92
HAtav. L. REv. 1160, 1167-69 (1979). See also Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d
1245, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1975) (agreement between supplier and new distributor to terminate
incumbent distributor does not violate antitrust laws). Some courts have upheld the substitu-
tion of one exclusive distributor for another on the ground that the substitution caused no net
reduction of competition in the relevant market. These cases emphasize that the antitrust
laws are concerned primarily with market structure rather than injury to a particular compet-
itor and that substituting one dealer for another has no effect on the market. See Ace Beer
Distribs. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963) (sub-
stitution of one brewer for another not illegal despite adverse effect on terminated brewer's
business); Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 227 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (replacement of existing distributor not a violation where no proof of public injury).
These cases, however, overlook the restriction of potential intrabrand competition that may
result from the substitution of one exclusive distributor for another in view of the fact that the
supplier might otherwise have allowed both distributors to coexist in the intrabrand market.
The Supreme Court has found the horizontal restriction of potential intrabrand competition
serious enough to justify application of the per se rule. See notes 91-93 and accompanying
text infa. Therefore, the per se rule should apply in any case in which a new distributor has
induced the supplier to replace an existing exclusive distributor, because of the horizontal
restriction of potential intrabrand competition resulting from such replacement. See notes
150-52 and accompanying text infra.
56 See Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981)
(no violation where exclusive franchisee convinced supplier not to grant another franchise);
Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 395 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing judgment in favor
of distributor with whom supplier allegedly refused to deal as result of complaints of incum-
bent distributor). These decisions relied not only on the absence of the broad horizontal
conspiracy required for a classic group boycott, but also on the fact that the refusal to deal
adversely affected only potential intrabrand competition. See Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo,
Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., 637 F.2d at 1385-86; Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d at 397.
Such reliance was misplaced, however, because the Supreme Court has deemed existing dis-
tributors' veto of potential intrabrand competition as sufficient in itself to justify application
of the per se rule. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See also Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 n. 1l (3d Cir. 1979) ("Interbrand competition
...has been labeled the 'primary concern of antitrust law' [citing GTE Soania] ....
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would not apply when a distributor's complaints about an actual or po-
tential competitor induce a supplier to refuse to deal with the competi-
tor and to appoint, or continue, the complaining distributor as an
exclusive.
The mechanical application of the rule of reason in these cases con-
tradicts the precedent of the group boycott cases.57 Under the group
boycott rationale, the per se rule should apply in any case in which an
exclusive distributor successfully uses its market power to induce the
supplier to refuse to deal with an actual or potential competitor.58 In
such situations, no less than in the classic group boycott cases, the only
purpose of he supplier's refusal to deal is to restrict competition be-
tween the terminated distributor and the exclusive distributor inducing
the refusal to deal. Nor is the adverse competitive effect of the elimina-
tion of the terminated distributor from the intrabrand market any less
serious than in the group boycott cases. Thus, by concentrating on the
apparent vertical form and overlooking the possible horizontal competi-
tive substance of the exclusive distributor cases, many courts have failed
to consider the application of the per se rule in situations in which its use
may indeed have been appropriate.
2. The Horizontal Plurality Cases
In the horizontal plurality cases, courts have acknowledged ex-
pressly that they will apply the per se rule only to mixed termination
conspiracies that are identical in form to a classic group boycott induced
by a broad horizontal combination of competitors5 9 Courts have held
in these cases that the per se rule does not apply if a refusal to deal is
induced by only one distributor, because there is no plurality of actors
on the inducing level who can enter into a horizontal conspiracy.60 The
Nonetheless, intrabrand competition. . . has not been of so little importance as never to
merit the protection of a per se rule.").
Courts have also frequently used the rule of reason to validate clauses in shopping center
leases giving tenants the right to veto leases of space to potential competitors. See, e.g., Dalmo
Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C.), afd, 429
F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970). A similar rationale could be used to uphold a distributor's veto of
a supplier's appointment of a competing firm as a distributor. But see note 153 infia.
57 See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
58 In Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), Judge Bazelon noted in dissent that before applying the
rule of reason to uphold a distributor termination and the subsequent appointment of a com-
petitor as an exclusive distributor, the majority should first have considered evidence that the
competitor had induced the termination. Such conduct, if proven, would have met the classic
requirements for the application of the per se rule because it would have no purpose other
than the elimination of the terminated distributor's competition. Sgeegenera//y notes 14-30 and
accompanying text sup ra.
59 See note 42 supra.
60 See Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1978) (no violation
when single advertiser induced publisher to refuse competitor's advertisements), cert denied,
440 U.S. 936 (1979); Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 446-47 (3d Cir.
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horizontal plurality cases may represent an even greater misuse of the
rule of reason than the exclusive distributor cases. In the latter cases, it
was at least likely in many instances that the supplier had decided inde-
pendently to refuse to deal with the terminated distributors.6' In the
horizontal plurality cases, however, a single distributor may have in-
duced the supplier to terminate a competing distributor, yet courts have
refused to apply the per se rule merely because the termination lacked
the broad horizontal character of a classic group boycott.62
This elevation of form over substance stems from a misreading of
the group boycott cases. Although each of the group boycott cases in-
volved a horizontal plurality of competing firms at some competitive
level,63 the horizontal plurality did not always exist on the same com-
petitive level as the firm inducing the boycott. For example, in Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. ,64 a single retailer induced its suppliers to
boycott a competing retailer. The evil perceived by the Supreme Court
was not the existence of a broad horizontal conspiracy, but the ability of
a firm at one competitive level to use its economic power to induce firms
at another competitive level to participate in a conspiracy and thereby
make the exclusion of competitors from the market more effective.6 5 Al-
1978) (sham bidding arrangement between vertical parties not a concerted refusal to deal);
Centurian Indus., Inc. v. Admiral Overseas Corp., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,990, at
76,163 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (supplier's decision to substitute one distributor for another not ille-
gal); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (manu-
facturer's alleged refusal to deal with distributor pursuant to agreement with competing
distributor not illegal because only single supplier and single dealer involved), reV'd on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
61 See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
62 See Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 510 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Schwing
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 905 (D. Md.), a fdpr cu'am, 239 F.2d
176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
63 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (combination of deal-
ers induced General Motors to prohibit sales to discounters); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam) (group of gas pipeline companies
refused to provide gas for plaintiff's heaters); Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959) (suppliers agreed to boycott retailer); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (member newspapers agreed not to disseminate news to nonmembers); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (garment manufacturers
agreed to limit sales to retailers observing certain conditions); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (retailers intended to induce boycott of
wholesalers selling directly to consumers). In the horizontal plurality cases, many courti have
relied on the Klor's Court's statement that group boycotts involve the actions of "a wide
combination" of firms. 359 U.S. at 213. See, e.g., Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 510
F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
64 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
65 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 422 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing), cerl. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Co.,
1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,780, at 78,168 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Hub Auto Supply, v. Auto-
matic Radio Mfg., 173 F. Supp. 396, 397 (D. Mass. 1959).
The Supreme Court's decision in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S.
464 (1962) ald supports the view that a finding of broad horizontal plurality should not be a
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though such inducement is more likely to be effective when several com-
petitors pool their economic power, a single firm may also possess
sufficient economic power to induce the exclusionary conduct.66 The
effect on competition is no less severe, and the exclusionary purpose no
less pernicious, when the termination is induced by one rather than sev-
eral competitors.67
Thus, the per se rule should apply regardless of whether a distribu-
tor's termination is induced by the complaints of one or several of its
competitors.68 By focusing mechanically on the horizontal plurality re-
prerequisite to'the application of the per se rule in mixed termination cases. In Poller, CBS
had terminated its affiliation with one UHF broadcasting station owned by Poller and had
subsequently affiliated with another UHF station it had purchased. Poller alleged that CBS
had conspired with the new affiliate to eliminate Poller's station from the market and destroy
the entire UHF industry. The Court held these allegations sufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment against Poller. The facts of the case were similar to the situation in
which a supplier terminates an existing distributor pursuant to an agreement with a single
aspiring distributor. This comparison must be qualified, however, by the fact that the Court
in Poller paid special attention to Poller's allegations that CBS had a broader intent to destroy
the entire UHF industry by eliminating Poller. 368 U.S. at 466, 472, 474.
66 In the original three-judge panel decision in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977), ajfden banc, 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978),
Judge Mansfield dissented from the majority's conclusion that a distributor termination in-
duced by a single competitor cannot be per se illegal. Noting that traditional group boycott
principles would apply if several competitors induced the termination, Judge Mansfield con-
cluded that the same per se rule should apply when the size and purchasing power of a single
inducing competitor amounts to "the equivalent of many. . . distributors." Id. at 66.
67 See L. SULLIvAN, supra note 25, at 429 n.1; Note, Economic Evidence Required to Establirh
Status of Teritorial and Customer Restrictions on Dealers-White Motor Co. v. United States, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 608, 619 n.84 (1963).
The fact that only a single supplier responds to a distributor's anticompetitive induce-
ment should also not preclude application of the per se rule. Under Supreme Court prece-
dent, horizontal plurality on the suppliers' level is no more a prerequisite to per se illegality
than is horizontal plurality on the distributors' level. The Court has deemed the elimination
of intrabrand competition by a single supplier sufficient to show a group boycott, see, e.g.,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), and to justify application of the
per se rule in mixed conspiracy cases, see notes 91-93 and accompanying text in a.
68 A few lower court decisions have extended the per se concept of the group boycott
cases to situations in which there is no broad horizontal combination. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) (finding no distinction between Ford
and group boycott cases; court applied per se rule to a series of customer resale restrictions
imposed by a supplier at insistence of one distributor); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager
Brewing, Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1963) (court referred to group boycott cases in uphold-
ing complaint alleging a conspiracy between supplier and non-competing distributors to pre-
vent another distributor from carrying products competitive with those of the supplier), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); United States v. New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79, 83-84 (7th Cir. 1949) (court found § 1 violation based in part upon a single firm's ability
to use its significant purchasing power to induce suppliers not to grant beneficial pricing to
competing purchasers); Hub Auto Supply, Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 173 F. Supp.
396, 397 (D. Mass. 1959) (court held that agreement between manufacturer and two compet-
ing distributors to eliminate a third distributor fell within group boycott doctrine). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission has expressly stated that refusals to deal induced by a single
competitor come within the per se rule of the group boycott cases. Ste Tysons Corner Re-
gional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970, 1010-11, modifed, 86 F.T.C. 921 (1975) (exercise of
right granted to store in shopping center lease to veto new tenants per se illegal).
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quirement in mixed termination cases, however, many courts have pre-
cluded any consideration of whether a single distributor's exercise of
economic power justifies application of the per se rule.
B. Overuse of the Per Se Rule
While certain courts have unduly favored suppliers in the exclusive
distributor and horizontal plurality cases by an overbroad use of the
rule of reason, other courts have unfairly applied the per se rule to sup-
pliers who retain the right to market their product on the resale level in
competition with their own wholesalers. Some courts have held that
these dual distributors69 commit per se violations when they impose cus-
tomer or territorial restrictions on their wholesalers30 Such restrictions,
courts have concluded, constitute a horizontal allocation of customers
and territories because the supplier is also a competitor of the restricted
wholesalers. 7" Under this rationale, a dual distributor may commit a
per se violation whenever he terminates a distributor with whom he
competes, regardless of the purpose of the termination. 72
Several courts and commentators have criticized the mechanical
application of the per se rule to all territorial and customer restrictions
imposed by dual distributors. 73 Application of the per se rule may not
69 The term "dual distributor" describes firms that not only supply wholesalers but also
sell their product directly to retail customers in competition with the wholesalers. See Pitof-
sky, supra note 22, at 31.
70 This line of cases derives from United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S.
305 (1956), in which the Court held that a manufacturer that also functions as a wholesaler
cannot enforce fair trade agreements with its wholesale distributors. Although McKesson did
not involve non-price restraints, lower courts have applied its per se rule to territorial and
customer restrictions imposed by dual distributors. See Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp.
v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Hobart Bros. Co. v.
Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Copy-
Data Sys. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,696 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), afder curaim, 417 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1969).
71 See, e.g., Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973).
72 See id.; Copy-Data Sys. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,696
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Inteiphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), afd per
cur'am, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.,
627 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule of reason applied to dual distributor's termination of
distributor for violating territorial and customer restrictions).
73 One commentator has pointed out that the lower courts' reliance on United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956), in the dual distributor cases was misplaced,
because McKesson was limited to a narrow question of statutory construction of the fair trade
immunity for resale price maintenance. See Steuer, Bqond Sylvania: Reason Relume to Vertical
Restraints, 47 ANurrUsT L.J. 1007, 1019-20 (1978). Steuer also maintains that some of the
lower court decisions are "gratuitous" because they were decided while United States v. Ar-
nold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overmled, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), was still good law and territorial restraints were per se illegal even if
vertical. See Steuer, supra, at 1020. A few recent cases have recognized that application of the
per se rule may not always be appropriate in dual distributor cases. See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-
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always be appropriate when a dual distributor enforces his territorial or
customer restrictions by terminating a dealer following complaints from
independent distributors. A dual distributor, like any other supplier,
may effect such a termination not to meet the distributors' anticompeti-
tive demands but to preserve territorial or customer restrictions that al-
low the dual distributor to attract aggressive distributors and thereby
engage in more effective interbrand competition. In such cases, the ter-
mination should be judged by the rule of reason. The fact that the dual
distributor happens to operate on two competitive levels should not
prejudice his right to use the termination weapon to enforce resale re-
strictions for the purpose of promoting interbrand competition. 74 In
other cases, however, a dual distributor's enforcement of territorial or
customer restrictions may be motivated by a desire to meet the demands
of independent distributors, or even personnel within the dual distribu-
tor's own organization, seeking to avoid competition with the termi-
nated distributor. In that event, the termination should be per se illegal
because it has no purpose other than the suppression of intrabrand com-
petition. 75 Although courts may experience difficulty in making the dis-
tinction between horizontal and vertical terminations by dual
distributors, 76 they should not avoid their responsibility to distinguish
per se from rule of reason conduct simply by deeming all dual distribu-
tors liable for terminating distributors to enforce territorial or customer
restrictions.
C. Judical Usurpation of the Fact-Finding Function
Relying on the principle that the form of a mixed termination con-
spiracy should determine its legality, some courts have concluded that
the per se rule must apply to all termination conspiracies among a sup-
plier and its distributors regardless of the supplier's competitive pur-
pose.77 This approach entails rather severe consequences when the fact-
finder infers a conspiracy from the supplier's mere receipt of complaints
Robbins Ice Cream, Inc., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982) (territorial restrictions imposed by
dual distributors not per se illegal); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637
F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule of reason applied when dual distributor had divergent interest
from other distributors); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1977) (rule of reason applied when Chrysler took temporary ownership interest in dealerships
to aid in financing of new dealers), cerl denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
74 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 52-55; Steuer, supra note
73, at 1020; Note, Antitrust Treatment of Intrabrand Territorial Restraints Within a Dual Distribution
System, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 1486, 1504 (1978).
75 See notes 14-30 and accompanying text supra; notes 141-44 and accompanying text
infra.
76 See Steuer, supra note 73, at 1019 n.77 (referring to the difficulty of distinguishing
vertical from horizontal restraints in the case of dual distributors). But see notes 141-44 and
accompanying text infra (suggesting a method for making that distinction).
77 See, e.g., Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 255, 258
(E.D. Pa. 1979), a fd, 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Oreck
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about a distributor's price-cutting, territorial incursions, or other com-
petitive activity. A supplier with independent business reasons for a ter-
mination may be found to have committed a per se antitrust violation
merely because he received complaints from distributors outside of his
control. In order to protect suppliers from the perceived severity of the
per se rule in such cases, many courts have required the' terminated dis-
tributor to meet a high initial standard of proof. These courts have held
that evidence of a supplier's receipt of complaints about the terminated
distributor cannot establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. 78 In grant-
ing summary judgment or a directed verdict for the supplier, courts
have pointed out that it would be unfair to infer an illegal agreement
because it is the "normal working of the marketplace" for distributors to
complain about competitors' marketing activities. 7 9
Such decisions are inconsistent with the courts' traditional defer-
ence to the fact-finder in antitrust actions.8 0 In other antitrust areas, the
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting unreported district court
opinion).
78 See Roesch Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 514 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Carr Elecs. Corp. v.
Sony Corp. of America, 472 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Carbon Steel Prods. v. Alan Wood
Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 42 ANTi-
TRUTs & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 563 (8th Cir. 1982) (termination following receipt of
price-cutting complaints allows inference of conspiracy).
79 Carbon Steel Prods. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. at 588. In Edwardj Swee-
ny &Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., the district court stated that "to draw an inference of combina-
tion between the maker and the recipient of a complaint from the mere receipt of a complaint
would be somewhat like holding that the subject of an attempted bribe is guilty of bribery."
478 F. Supp. at 257 n.32. Some commentators have pointed out the inequity of forcing a
supplier who has received such complaints to suffer "costly and drawn out" antitrust litiga-
tion. See, e.g., Elias, supra note 52, at 445; Posner, supra note 33, at 15.
80 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962):
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken
the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-exami-
nation that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be
appraised.
See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976). But see Alad-
din Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1979) (criticizing Poller and
arguing that courts should not automatically deny summary judgment motions when anti-
trust issues are involved).
The fact-finder may play a particularly important role in dealer termination cases, where
anticompetitive purposes such as eliminating price-cutters may differ little from such possible
procompetitive purposes as eliminating "free riders," and the "evidence will often reflect
what counsel advise businessmen their purpose should have been." Pitofsky, supra note 22, at
35. See also Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 123-25 (3d Cir.
1980) (Sloviter, J., dissenting), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). In such cases, the fact-finder
should be allowed to weigh the conflicting inferences and the credibility of witnesses to deter-
mine the parties' actual intent. As one commentator has stated, "Inhere is one task that
judges and juries, informed through the adversary system, may really be good at. It is identi-
fying the pernicious in human affairs." L. SCHWARTZ &J. FLYNN, ANTrrRUST AND REGULA-
TORY ALTERNATIvES 125 (5th ed. 1977) (quoting early draft of Sullivan, Economis and More
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fact-finder has been allowed to infer the existence of an agreement from
ambivalent conduct.81 Because direct evidence of an illegal agreement
is rarely available in today's sophisticated business climate, courts have
permitted the inference of a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.8 2
Courts usually defer to the jury, as the reasoned voice of the community,
to resolve the conflicting inferences presented by such circumstantial ev-
idence and to determine whether the alleged conspirators reached a true
meeting of the minds.83 In several mixed termination cases, however,
the terminated distributor has presented prima facie evidence of con-
spiracy, yet the courts have refused to allow the jury to decide the ques-
tion of conspiracy.84
The avoidance of the jury in such cases would be unnecessary if
courts would recognize that the per se rule need not automatically apply
when the existence of a conspiracy is inferred from distributor com-
plaints. Many courts have failed to distinguish between conduct that
constitutes conspiracy, on the one hand, and conspiracies that violate
the antitrust laws, on the other.85 Their "mechanistic search for direct
evidence of a combination diverts consideration away from the more
significant issue, which is the appropriate treatment of such conduct
Humanistic Disdplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrurt?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214,
1230 (1977)).
81 Courts have frequently upheld jury verdicts based on circumstantial evidence of an
anticompetitive conspiracy. Fact-finders have been allowed to infer the existence of a con-
spiracy from prima facie evidence of apparent common purpose, see American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (parties could have mutually benefited from an anticom-
petitive agreement), communications among the parties providing an opportunity for agree-
ment, see id. at 787; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 269-71 (1942); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co., 306 U.S. 208, 210 (1939), and subsequent
parallel conduct appearing to implement the alleged agreement, see Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,
192 F.2d 579, 584 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952); Ball v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 169 F.2d 317, 319 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 911 (1950).
82 See Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d at 583; Pitofsky, supira note 22, at 35.
83 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946); Ed-
ward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 119 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
84 When a supplier receives complaints about a distributor's price-cutting or other com-
petitive activities from a distributor's competitor and soon thereafter terminates the offending
distributor, the terminated distributor should have little difficulty making out a prima facie
case of conspiracy between the supplier and the complaining distributor. See note 81 supra.
The supplier and complaining distributor obviously have a common intention to effect the
termination; the supplier's receipt of complaints and his response thereto establish the oppor-
tunity for a meeting of the minds, and the subsequent termination supplies the conduct to
complete the conspiracy. Nevertheless, several courts have precluded any consideration of the
conspiracy question by the fact-finder by ordering summary judgment or a directed verdict in
favor of the supplier in such cases. See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 514 F. Supp. 890
(E.D. Mo. 1981); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Carbon Steel Prods. v. Sony Corp. of America, 472 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
85 Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
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under the antitrust laws."'8 6 As the Supreme Court has recognized in
several mixed conspiracy cases, a court must analyze the substantive
competitive purpose of a conspiracy before determining its legality.8 7
Under this substantive approach, the per se rule need not apply, even
after a conspiracy has been inferred, unless the terminated distributor
can demonstrate that the supplier had no independent business reasons
for the termination and was motivated only by a desire to protect the
complaining distributors against intrabrand competition. By providing
for a separate determination of the competitive purpose in mixed termi-
nation conspiracies, courts can free the fact-finder to consider a termi-
nated distributor's circumstantial evidence of conspiracy without fear of
unfairly applying the per se rule. Under this approach, the fact-finder
would no longer be precluded from considering the most important issue
in mixed termination cases: the supplier's competitive motive for effect-
ing the termination.
III
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FOR SEPARATELY
DETERMINING COMPETITIVE PURPOSE
The lower courts' failure adequately to analyze mixed termination
conspiracies stems from their improper analysis of relevant Supreme
Court precedent. In deciding whether to employ a horizontal or vertical
approach to mixed termination conspiracies, these courts have focused
on the form of the conspiracies. A closer reading of Supreme Court pre-
cedent, however, reveals that the competitive purpose-not the form-
of a mixed termination conspiracy ought to determine whether a hori-
zontal or vertical analysis is applied.
In United States v. Sealy, Inc. ,88 the Court first applied the per se rule
to an ostensibly vertical restraint on the basis of the horizontal competi-
tive purpose of the restraint. Sealy, Inc. had imposed territorial restric-
tions and minimum resale prices on certain firms licensed under the
"Sealy" trademark. The licensees owned a majority of Sealy's stock and
dominated its board of directors. The Court stated that the purpose of
the territorial restrictions should determine the manner in which they
were analyzed under the Sherman Act.8 9 The Court concluded that al-
though the territorial restrictions were vertical in form, Sealy, Inc. was
in fact "an instrumentality of the licensees for purposes of the horizontal
territorial allocation."' 9 Because the territorial allocations as well as the
86 Id. at 131.
87 See notes 88-97 and accompanying text infra.
88 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
89 Id. at 352.
90 Id. at 354. Subsequent lower court decisions found territorial restraints in the mat-
tress industry per se illegal on similar facts. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. v. Sealy, Inc., 585
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resale price restrictions had a horizontal competitive purpose, both re-
strictions were held to be per se illegal.
In United States v. Topco Associates,91 the Court extended the Seal-Y
rationale to territorial limitations without any ancillary price-fixing.
Topco, an association composed of and controlled by twenty-five re-
gional supermarket chains, had entered into licenses with each of its
members for the use of the "Topco" brand name. The licenses assigned
restricted territories to the Topco members and provided that new licen-
sees would have to be approved by a vote of the members. The Court
noted that members thus had "a veto power of sorts" over actual or
potential competition.92 The Court determined, as it had in Sealy, that
despite the apparent vertical form of the arrangement, the territorial
allocation had in fact been instituted by the competing supermarket
chains acting through Topco. Because, in substance, the territorial re-
straints had been horizontally imposed, the per se rule applied.93
United States v. General Motors Corp. 94 suggests that the Sealy-Topco
principle may extend beyond the case in which a supplier serves as the
alter ego of its distributors. In General Motors, a group of automobile
dealers seeking to avoid competition with discounters had induced Gen-
eral Motors to prohibit all of its dealers from selling automobiles to the
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Serta Assoc., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
afd, 393 U.S. 534 (1969).
91 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
92 Id. at 602.
93 The Court refused to consider whether the territorial restraints allowed Topco's pri-
vate brand to compete more effectively with other brands, concluding that, in light of the
anticompetitive purpose of the restraints, the restraints' adverse impact on intrabrand compe-
tition justified application of the per se rule without any inquiry into possible beneficial inter-
brand effects. Id. at 610-12.
One commentator has viewed the Topeo Court's failure to balance interbrand competi-
tive benefits against adverse intrabrand effects as an unfortunate consequence of the fact that
the case was decided before the adoption of GTE Sylvania's balancing test for non-price verti-
cal restrictions. See Comment, A Proposed Rule ofReason Analysixfor Restrictions on Distribution, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 555 (1979). Indeed, several commentators have argued that Topco's
per se rule may be inappropriate in mixed horizontal/vertical cases that do not involve price-
fixing. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Tem--
1977, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 987 (1977); Posner, supra note 22, at 24-25; Note, Teitorialand
Customer Restrictions: A Trend Towarda Broader Rule ofReason, 40 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 123, 149
(1971). In GTE Sylvania, however, the Court specifically re-affirmed Topco's per se rule for
mixed horizontal/vertical conspiracies in which horizontal purposes predominate. 433 U.S.
at 58 n.28. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1978),
involved territorial restrictions similar to those considered in the original Seal decision.
Sealy's organization, which in the original Seatv decision had led the Court to conclude that
the territorial restrictions were horizontal in substance, had not changed. The defendant
argued that the restrictions should be judged under GTE Sylvania's rule of reason rather than
under the per se approach of Sealy and Topco. The court rejected the argument, observing
that GTE Sylvania specifically retained Toco's per se rule for restrictions horizontal in sub-
stance. This precedent indicates that Topco's per se rule against territorial allocations effected
by distributors through a common supplier has survived GTE Sylvania.
94 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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discounters. The Court recognized that the apparent vertical form of
the resale restrictions should not insulate General Motors from per se
liability when, in implementing the restrictions, it had merely acqui-
esced in the anticompetitive purposes of the dealers. 95
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court looked to the competitive
substance of apparently vertical restrictions and applied the per se rule
because the restrictions actually originated from a horizontal conspiracy
designed to restrict intrabrand competition. These decisions indicate
that the parties' competitive purpose, rather than the mere form of their
agreement, should determine whether a vertical or horizontal analysis is
applied to a termination allegedly induced by complaining distributors.
If the termination is induced by the distributors, as in General Motors, the
per se rule should apply regardless of the apparent vertical form of the
termination, because the supplier's only purpose for refusing to deal is to
restrict competition among the distributors.96 If, however, the supplier
is motivated by his own business purposes, the termination should be
judged as vertical conduct, and the per se rule should apply only if the
supplier is attempting to maintain resale prices.9 7
95 Id. at 145-47.
96 Indeed, at least one Supreme Court Justice recognized prior to General Motors that
restraints induced by distributors should be per se illegal, despite the fact that a supplier
imposed the restraints. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("If it were clear that the territorial restrictions involved in this case
had been induced solely or even primarily by [White Motor's] dealers and distributors, it
would make no difference to their legality that the restrictions were formally imposed by the
manufacturer rather than through inter-dealer agreement.") (footnote omitted). A few lower
federal courts have also recognized that a refusal to deal induced by a competing distributor
has an anticompetitive purpose justifying use of the perse rule even when the refusal to deal
takes a vertical form. See Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 563 (8th Cir. 1982) (per se rule may apply to termination allegedly induced by single
distributor who complained about terminated distributor's price competition); Com-Tel, Inc.
v. Du-Kane Corp., 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1982) (com-
paring case to Cernuto and emphasizing that "although the restraints were nominally applied
vertically... [their purpose was to] exclude [a] horizontal competitor.'); Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979) (per se analysis justified because only
purpose of termination would be "to eliminate competition at the retail level, and not. . . to
promote competition at the manufacturer level"). See also CUSCO v. Certain-teed Prods.
Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1072 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981); Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co.,
635 F.2d 1222, 1225 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980).
97 See notes 31-48 and accompanying text supra. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 80 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970), the court recognized that if the cause of a termination is vertical in substance, the
termination should be judged by the rule of reason even though the termination may have
been effected pursuant to a conspiracy horizontal in form. In Seagram, two suppliers had
agreed that they would terminate their separate distributorship agreements with the plaintiff.
The court held that the horizontal conspiracy was not a per se group boycott, because in
terminating the plaintiff, the suppliers had each been motivated by their dissatisfaction with
the plaintiff's performance.
Despite the Supreme Court precedent indicating that the source of a mixed termination
conspiracy should determine its legality, some commentators have viewed the difficulty of
distinguishing vertical from horizontal conduct in the mixed termination area as a rationale
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IV
PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF MIXED TERMINATION
CONSPIRACIES
The Supreme Court cases involving mixed conspiracies suggest a
way out of the lower federal courts' dilemma in analyzing such conspira-
cies. By looking beyond the form of a conspiracy to its activating source,
the Court has formulated a sensible, consistent, and equitable standard
for applying the per se rule. A similar approach in mixed termination
cases should prevent the inconsistencies, inequities, and unnecessary
avoidance of the fact-finder that have characterized many such cases in
the lower federal courts. The following is therefore proposed as a
method, consistent with this Supreme Court precedent, for analyzing
the termination of a distributor by a supplier that has received com-
plaints about the distributor's competitive activities from other
distributors.
Because the competitive purpose and effect of a mixed termination
conspiracy does not depend upon its form, courts should adopt a uni-
form approach to all mixed termination conspiracies. In each case, the
supplier's motivation for effecting the termination should determine
whether the court applies a horizontal or vertical analysis. If the sup-
plier terminates a distributor for independent business purposes, the ter-
mination should be treated as vertical conduct and, in the absence of
resale price-fixing, either the Colgate defense or the rule of reason should
apply. On the other hand, if the supplier terminates the distributor
merely to satisfy the anticompetitive purposes of a complaining distribu-
tor or distributors, the termination should be treated as horizontal con-
duct and declared per se illegal.
In order to protect suppliers against undue application of the per se
rule, the fact-finder should engage in a two-step analysis in mixed termi-
nation cases. First, in order to bring the challenged termination within
the language of section 1, the terminated distributor must demonstrate
the existence of an agreement between the supplier and the complaining
distributor. As in other antitrust areas, however, the fact-finder should
be allowed to infer the agreement from circumstantial evidence. 98
for abandoning such a substantive analysis entirely. As one commentator has stated, "[A]n
approach that attempts to determine which party's interest or initiative is more fully served
by the agreement encounters difficulties; for the most significant interests of the manufacturer
are themselves framed in terms of the interests of the dealer." Note, Restried Chamnnef of
Dislribution Under the Shmennan Act, 75 HARv. L. REv. 795, 825 (1962). See aso Buxbaum, sufira
note 25, at 683-84; Comment, su pra note 93, at 566. The analysis proposed in this Article,
however, provides an effective method for distinguishing the interests of suppliers and distrib-
utors in a mixed termination conspiracy consistent with the Supreme Court precedent that
the activating source of such conspiracies should determine their legality. See generaly notes
98-105 and accompanying text infra.
98 See notes 80-83 and accompanying text sufira.
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If the fact-finder infers the existence of an agreement, it will then
consider the second and most important issue: the supplier's competi-
tive purpose for entering into the agreement. This issue will require a
determination of whether the termination was provoked by the sup-
plier's agreement with the competing distributor or by the supplier's in-
dependent exercise of business judgment. In some cases, a supplier may
have a legitimate motive for effecting the termination that is distinct
from the anticompetitive motives of the complaining distributor. The
fact that the supplier agrees with the complaining distributor to effect
the termination should not prove that he shares the distributor's an-
ticompetitive purpose. The supplier, for example, may agree to termi-
nate the distributor simply because he is dissatisfied with the
distributor's poor performance.99 If the supplier's dissatisfaction is so
great that he would have terminated the distributor even in the absence
of the agreement with the distributor's competitor, the agreement is not
the proximate cause of the terminated distributor's injury and cannot be
a basis for the supplier's liability.l'0 Indeed, the net effect on competi-
tion in such a case would be no different than if the supplier and com-
peting distributor had never entered into an agreement. 10 1 Therefore,
the per se rule should apply only if the supplier would not have termi-
nated the distributor "but for" the supplier's agreement with one or
more of the distributor's competitors. Only then could the supplier be
said to have participated in a conspiracy, the single purpose of which
was to eliminate the competition of the terminated distributor.10 2
A separate analysis of the questions of conspiracy and the activat-
ing cause of a termination is necessary because those two questions in-
volve entirely different evidentiary and policy considerations. 10 3 The
question of conspiracy must be resolved in order to meet the technical
99 See Comment, Vertical Agreement as Horizontal Restraint Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabi-
net Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REv. 622, 647 (1980).
100 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate that he has been "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws. . . ." Courts have construed this language to require a causal nexus be-
tween the plaintiff's injury and the prohibited antitrust conduct. See, e.g., Hobart Bros. Co. v.
Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973). Thus,
there can be no antitrust liability in the absence of "some causal connection between the
alleged conspiracy and the refusal to deal." Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp.
711, 721 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
101 Cf. Turner, supra note 33, at 705 ("The manufacturer might be able to rebut the
prima facie case [of an illegal conspiracy between the manufacturer and a distributor] by
showing that the distributor's threat played no part in his decision, ie., that he would have
done the same thing anyway.").
102 See Comment, supra note 99, at 648. But see Posner, supra note 22, at 298 (arguing
against determining the appropriateness of per se rule on the basis of whether the activating
source of a restraint is horizontal or vertical).
103 Some courts have confused these two questions. For example, in Edward J. Sweeney
& Sons Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981), the
Third Circuit viewed proof of a causal connection between competitors' complaints and the
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prerequisites of section 1. In resolving the conspiracy issue, the fact-
finder must determine whether the supplier and complaining distribu-
tors were mutually committed to another distributor's termination; that
determination will turn on such factors as the nature and timing of com-
munications among the parties. The question of the activating cause of
the termination, however, must be resolved in order to determine
whether the conspiracy constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade
within the substantive meaning of section 1. That determination' can be
made only by considering the supplier's competitive motive for entering
into the conspiracy.
Separating the issue of cause from the issue of conspiracy should
ensure that the courts distinguish more fairly and consistently between
horizontal and vertical approaches to mixed termination conspiracies.
Regardless of the form of the conspiracy, a horizontal analysis would
apply whenever the supplier was motivated by the anticompetitive de-
mands of a complaining distributor in effecting a termination.10 4 If,
however, the supplier had an independent purpose for terminating the
distributor, the court would apply the rule of reason and Colgate defenses
appropriate for such vertical conduct. This approach should guarantee
that truly anticompetitive terminations do not escape per se liability
merely because they lack the broad horizontal form of a classic group
boycott. On the other hand, a supplier, whether or not it happens to
operate at one or more competitive levels, will not be precluded from
enforcing legitimate restrictions on intrabrand distribution. Because
suppliers will be held per se liable only if they share the anticompetitive
purpose of complaining distributors, courts should not feel compelled to
avoid the fact-finder in those frequent cases in which only circumstan-
tial evidence of a supplier's participation in a conspiracy is available.105
By separately focusing the attention of the fact-finder upon the legiti-
supplier's response as "[t]he necessary first step toward. . . proof of. . .conspiracy." Id. at
111.
104 The per se rule would be appropriate because the complaining distributor's only pur-
pose in inducing the termination would be to restrict competition between itself and the
terminated distributor. See notes 14-30 and accompanying text supra. The fact that only
intrabrand competition would be affected by the termination should not preclude use of the
per se rule. See Ceruto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Interbrand competition. . . has been labelled the 'primary concern of antitrust law' [citing
GTE Sylvania]. Nonetheless, intrabrand competition.., has not been of so little importance
as never to merit the protection of a per se rule." (citing United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), and United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1959))).
105 This approach will focus the fact-finder's attention upon the substance of the parties'
conduct and away from the formalistic question of the existence of a conspiracy. Several
commentators have emphasized that courts should avoid a preoccupation with the question
of conspiracy and should concentrate instead on the substantive purpose and effect of the
conduct at issue. See, e.g., Turner, s.upra note 33, at 683-84. Professor Turner has also pointed
out that a full consideration of competitive purpose is particularly important in the case of a
mixed conspiracy: "[Tlhe economic consequences of a vertical-horizontal arrangement may
well vary substantially depending on where the initiative came from and... legal conclu-
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macy of a supplier's motives for effecting a termination, the two-step
approach outlined above should result in a more consistent and equita-
ble application of the per se rule and the rule of reason than that result-
ing from the lower federal courts' current formalistic approach to mixed
terminations.
A. The Conspirag Issue
Courts' traditional deference to the fact-finder in antitrust actions
requires that a terminated distributor be allowed to establish a prima
facie case of conspiracy through circumstantial evidence.10 6 Such a
prima facie case may consist of evidence of a distributor's complaints to
a supplier about another distributor's price-cutting, territorial incur-
sions, or other competitive activities, and the subsequent termination of
the offending distributor. When a distributor complains to a supplier
about such competitive activities, the fact-finder may reasonably assume
that the distributor is attempting to induce the supplier to do something
to prevent such activities in the future. 10 7 The supplier may respond to
these complaints in several different ways. If the complaints concern a
distributor's price-cutting, for example, the supplier may attempt to co-
erce the offending distributor into maintaining higher resale prices, con-
vince the offending distributor to refrain from selling at lower prices
within the complaining distributor's territory, or simply terminate the
offending distributor. Any of these responses presumably would be ac-
ceptable to the complaining distributor. Therefore, if the supplier ter-
minates the offending distributor following the receipt of such
complaints, the fact-finder should be able to infer that the supplier and
complaining distributor were mutually committed to the termination.10 8
Several courts have noted the unfairness of concluding, solely from
evidence of distributor complaints, that a supplier has engaged in an
illegal conspiracy to terminate another distributor. The receipt of such
complaints, some courts argue, may be merely fortuitous and should not
preclude a supplier from exercising its right to determine independently
the form of its distribution system.' 0 9 Consequently, many courts have
sought to protect suppliers in such situations by refusing to allow the
inference of a conspiracy from the terminated distributor's circumstan-
sions should not be made without taking this into account." Id. at 699. See also Elias, supra
note 52, at 473.
106 See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
107 See Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir. 1963).
108 See id.; Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1957).
109 See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 395 (2d Cir. 1980); Davis-Watkins
Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Carr Elec. Corp.
v. Sony Corp. of America, 472 F. Supp. 9, 13 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Garrett's Inc. v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 412 F. Supp. 656, 660 n.3 (D.S.C. 1976); Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel
Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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tial evidence."10 Under the proposed analysis, however, allowing the in-
ference of conspiracy from circumstantial evidence should not unduly
prejudice suppliers. A supplier would have the opportunity to rebut the
prima facie case of conspiracy and, even if the fact-finder were to infer
the existence of a conspiracy, the per se rule could not be applied until
the fact-finder had concluded that the supplier had no independent
business reasons for the termination.
A supplier might rebut a prima facie case of conspiracy by showing
that the timing and nature of the complaints negate any inference of a
meeting of the minds among the supplier and complaining distributors.
If, for example, the supplier did not receive the complaints until after
making the decision to terminate the distributor, the fact-finder should
not view the termination as a response to the complaints. 1 If the com-
plaints occurred a significant time before the supplier's decision to ter-
minate a distributor, the supplier might demonstrate that the
complaining distributors' offer to participate in a termination conspir-
acy had lapsed. 1 2 A supplier may also demonstrate that, although its
lower-level employees received the complaints immediately prior to the
termination, the complaints were never communicated to the managers
who made the termination decision.11 3
Certain distributor complaints may not support the inference of a
termination conspiracy because they neither expressly nor impliedly
carry a request for another distributor's termination. A distributor com-
plaining about a competitor's low resale prices may, for example, intend
not to induce the supplier to terminate the competitor, but to grant the
complaining distributor the same lower price or other favorable sales
terms available to the competitor.1 14 In other cases, a distributor's com-
110 See notes 79-84 and accompanying text sufra.
111 Courts and commentators have pointed out that prima facie proof of a § 1 conspiracy
must at least include evidence that all parties to the alleged conspiracy were mutually aware
of the objectives of the conspiracy and of each other's intention to participate in the conspir-
acy. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316
F.2d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1963); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 374 (9th Cir. 1957); An
Interview with the Honorable Donald F Turner, 37 ANTrrRUST L.J. 290, 300-01 (1968); Kaysen,
Collason Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. EcON. 263, 268-69 (1965). That mutual awareness
could not exist if the supplier received no notice of the complaints until after making the
decision to terminate the distributor.
112 See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d at 112 (3d Cir. 1980)
(fact that complaints began five years before supplier's alleged response deemed indication of
absence of conspiracy among supplier and complaining distributors), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981).
113 See Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 1963) (finding
no conspiracy when evidence did not indicate the suppliers sales representative had ever
communicated distributors' complaints to supplier).
114 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Laboratories, Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 674
(9th Cir. 1975). Complaints from distributors about more favorable prices or sales terms
granted to their competitors are quite predictable and, indeed, may point out a suppliers
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munications to a supplier about another distributor may not even con-
stitute complaints about the other distributor's competitive activities. A
court should not view such communications as an attempt to induce the
supplier to terminate the other distributor. The communications may,
for example, have pointed out matters such as another distributor's poor
service or advertising, or carrying of other brands competitive with the
supplier's product. In such cases, the distributor's conduct would con-
cern the supplier but not other distributor's, and the fact-finder might
conclude that the "complaining" distributor merely intended to inform
the supplier of marketing information in which he would presumably be
interested. 115 Indeed, if the competing distributor has not engaged in
any activity harmful to the complaining distributor, it would be reason-
able to assume that the complaining distributor does not care whether
the competing distributor is terminated. The supplier and complaining
distributor therefore should not be deemed to have reached a meeting of
the minds on the termination." 6
A supplier has greater access than a terminated distributor to evi-
dence of whether a mixed termination conspiracy ever existed. The is-
sue of conspiracy will, after all, turn primarily on the supplier's
awareness and interpretation of the complaints of other distributors.
Therefore, the burden of disproving the existence of a conspiracy should
rest with the supplier once the terminated distributor has introduced
circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy. Furthermore, because the
supplier's employees are most likely to be aware of the facts indicating
whether a conspiracy ever existed, the supplier's failure to introduce tes-
timony from these employees may properly result in an adverse infer-
ence against the supplier.117 Because evidence in modern antitrust cases
violation of the anti-price discrimination provisions of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). See Baer v. Esprit de Corp., [1980-81] Trade Cas. (COCH) 63,614
(N.D. Cal. 1980). If, on the other hand, a complaining distributor intends to induce the
supplier to grant it more favorable terms of sale than those available to competing distribu-
tors, the inducement could be illegal under § 2(f of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(o (1976).
115 See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1980) (no illegal conspiracy
when competing distributor complained about allegedly false and misleading advertising of
terminated distributor). But see Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1,
7-8 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding complaint alleging conspiracy among supplier and distributors
to prevent distributors from carrying products competitive with those of supplier), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 976 (1966).
116 A vertical agreement between the supplier and terminated distributor, however, may
be implied. If, for example, the termination followed the supplier's receipt of information
concerning the distributor's merchandising of competing products, the fact-finder might find
that the supplier attempted to coerce the distributor into observing an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement. If it could be shown under the rule of reason that such an agreement had the
requisite anticompetitive effect, the agreement might be illegal under either § 1 of the Sher-
man Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act. See Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir.
1964); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
117 Some courts have inferred a conspiracy when a defendant in a position to know
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is often inconclusive and only reflects "what counsel advise businessmen
their purpose should have been,"'1 18 the fact-finder should be allowed to
weigh the distributor's circumstantial case against the supplier's rebuttal
evidence and determine, as the reasoned voice of the community, which
view is most credible.
If the fact-finder concludes that the timing or nature of a distribu-
tor's omplaints do not support an inference of conspiracy between the
supplier and complaining distributor, the termination should be ana-
lyzed as vertical conduct. Although no mixed horizontal/vertical agree-
ment will be at issue, the fact-finder might still find an express or
implied vertical contract that brings the termination within section .1. If
the supplier has terminated the distributor for violating territorial or
customer restrictions in its distributor contract, the contract restrictions
themselves should be examined under the rule of reason to determine
whether their procompetitive effect on interbrand competition out-
weighs their adverse impact on intrabrand competition.1 19 If the termi-
nated distributor was a price-cutter, the court might infer the existence
of a per se illegal resale price-fixing conspiracy from the termination.1 20
Such an inference could be made if the supplier directly threatened the
distributor with termination for failing to maintain certain resale prices
or if the supplier engaged in a pattern of coercion or actual terminations
of other distributors that failed to abide by those prices.121
In the absence of an express or implied agreement, the vertical ter-
mination would not be subject to section 1.122 Provided that the termi-
nation was not effected to enforce a restriction on resale activities or to
coerce a distributor into observing any such restriction, the termination
would be deemed unilateral and thus valid under the Colgate defense. 123
whether an agreement existed has failed to call any witnesses to testify as to the absence of an
agreement. See William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir.
1945). In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939), the Supreme
Court, confronted by the defendants' failure to call witnesses who could directly rebut the
inference of a § 1 conspiracy, stated, "The production of weak evidence when strong is avail-
able can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse."
118 Pitofsky, supra note 22, at 35.
119 See notes 34-47 and accompanying text supra. A per se horizontal territorial allocation
should not be inferable merely because the supplier imposed parallel territorial or customer
restrictions in each of its distributor contracts. In the absence of some direct interaction
among the distributors, their parallel conduct in entering into the separate distribution con-
tracts should be insufficient to demonstrate a horizontal conspiracy. See Anderson v. Ameri-
can Auto. Assoc., 454 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1972); Klein v. American Luggage Works,
Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); Turner, supra note 33, at 700.
120 e notes 33 &*42 and accompanying text sfupra.
121 See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46,52 (2d Cir. 1980); notes 33-42 and accompa-
nying text supra.
122 See notes 32-33 and accompanying text sup ra.
123 See Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (upholding
unilateral termination in absence of attempt to affect resale activities); House of Materials,
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B. The Causation Issue
1. Analyzing the Causation Issue
If the fact-finder concludes that a supplier and complaining distrib-
utor agreed to terminate a competing distributor, the fact-finder should
next consider whether the termination was actually caused by the agree-
ment. The court should apply the per se rule only if the fact-finder
answers this question in the affirmative. Such a separate causal analysis
is necessary because the supplier may have been motivated by business
reasons independent of the agreement in effecting the termination. The
supplier's business reasons, unlike those of the complaining distributor,
may not have been entirely anticompetitive and therefore should not
subject the supplier to per se liability.
In attempting to induce a termination, a competing distributor can
only be motivated by a desire to eliminate the intrabrand competition of
the terminated distributor. 24 The supplier, however, occupies a differ-
ent level in the distribution chain and, in terminating a distributor, may
therefore be motivated by a desire to increase the interbrand effective-
ness of its distribution system as well as to restrict intrabrand competi-
tion. 125 Distributors' complaints about a competitor's incursion into
their territories may, for example, apprise the supplier of the offending
distributor's failure to develop his assigned territory adequately. Simi-
larly, complaints about price-cutting may alert the supplier to a distrib-
utor's inferior service or merchandising. In these situations, the
complaints may "simply catalyze a decision to terminate or replace a
distributor whose performance has been unsatisfactory."' 126 The termi-
nation of such a distributor may allow the supplier to concentrate his
resale efforts on more effective distributors and thereby compete more
effectively against other brands. Courts should employ a vertical analy-
sis to judge such procompetitive effects when a supplier's only motive in
agreeing to a termination is to promote its independent business
interests.
The per se rule therefore should apply only to mixed termination
conspiracies in which the supplier would not have effected the termina-
tion "but for" its agreement with.a complaining distributor. The "but
for" test provides an effective method of determining whether business
reasons independent of a distributor's complaints motivated a supplier
in effecting a termination. The test forces the fact-finder to consider
how the supplier would have acted in the absence of the complaints. If
Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); Garrett's, Inc. v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 412 F. Supp. 656 (D.S.C. 1976) (same).
124 See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004
n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).
125 See notes 40-47 and accompanying text supra.
126 Comment, supra note 22, at 1169.
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the supplier would have acted in the same manner had it learned of the
terminated distributor's conduct independently of the complaints, the
complaints should be deemed irrelevant, and the fact-finder should con-
sider the legitimacy of the supplier's independent purposes for the termi-
nation under a vertical analysis.
If the "but for" test is satisfied, the supplier's competitive purpose
need ,not be considered. In such a case, the supplier would have been
motivated solely by a desire to satisfy the anticompetitive demands of
the complaining distributors, and the distributors' complaints would be
the proximate cause of the termination. The per se rule would be ap-
propriate because the supplier would have been enlisted to participate
in a group boycott designed solely to restrict intrabrand competition. 127
Although under GTE Sylvania a supplier initially may consider its pro-
spective distributors' anticompetitive interests in designing territorial
limitations that are attractive to aggressive resellers, it oversteps GTE
Sylvania when it participates in a horizontally induced conspiracy to ex-
clude a competing distributor from the market. 128 A supplier who par-
ticipates in such a group boycott should not escape per se liability
merely because its participation lends a superficial vertical appearance
to the conspiracy. 129
Either a single distributor or a group of several distributors may
possess sufficient market power to induce a supplier to terminate a dis-
tributor that it otherwise would have retained. If, for example, a single
distributor of significant size complains to a supplier about the activities
of a competing distributor and threatens to withhold purchases unless
the supplier terminates the other distributor, the supplier may feel no
less compelled to accede to the distributor's anticompetitive scheme
than if several small distributors had complained. If the termination
would not have occurred "but for" the threats from the single distribu-
tor, the per se rule should apply notwithstanding the absence of "hori-
zontal plurality."130 A termination caused by one distributor is just as
127 See notes 14-30 and accompanying text supra.
128 In such a situation, the supplier, like the suppliers in Topico and General Motors, is
acting for the horizontal conspirators in effecting the termination. See notes 91-95 and accom-
panying text srupra. GTE Slvania expressly retained the per se rule for such situations. 433
U.S. at 58 n.28.
129 The Supreme Court has held that the per se rule should apply to apparent vertical
restraints whenever competitors are the activating source of the restraints. See notes 88-95
and accompanying text sura.
130 A few courts have recognized that the per se rule may apply when a single distributor
induces or otherwise causes a competitors termination. See Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 42 ANT-
TRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 563 (8th Cir. 1982); Coin-Tel, Inc. v. Du-Kane Corp., 42
ANarrRusT & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) 317 (6th Cir. 1982); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466
(8th Cir. 1976); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963).
Seealso CUSCO v. Certain-teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1072 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981); Alloy
Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1225 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington
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pernicious in purpose and effect as a termination induced by several
distributors.1 3 1 Indeed, the single distributor in such a case would have
successfully exercised a market power equivalent to that exercised by the
broad horizontal conspiracies of distributors in group boycott cases such
as General Motors. 132
2. Allocating the Burden of Proof
Once the terminated distributor has proven the existence of a
mixed termination conspiracy, a rebuttable presumption gendrally
should arise that the conspiracy caused the termination. The suipplier
would therefore have the burden of rebutting this presumption by prov-
ing independent business reasons for the termination. 133 This allocation
of the burden of proof is equitable because the supplier is the party most
likely to have access to evidence that would prove the actual cause of
termination. 134 Only employees of the supplier, after all, can explain
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (3d Cir. 1979); Tysons Corner
Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970, 1010-11 (1975). But see notes 59-62 and accimpa-
nying text supra (cases barring application of the per se rule in absence of "horizontal plural-
ity').
In many of these cases, the courts relied on a price-fixing theory in concluding that the
per se rule could be applied when a single distributor induces a competitor's termination.
The courts emphasized that the per se rule was appropriate in such cases because the termina-
tion was motivated by a desire to reduce or eliminate price competition. See Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 42 ANTrrRusT & TRADE, REG. REP. 565 (8th Cir. 1982); CUSCO v. Certain-
teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d at 1073-74; Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d
at 1225 n.5; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d at 1069-70; Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d at 170; Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc.,
325 F.2d at 199-200. The Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its limitation of the Cernuto per se
rule to terminations designed to affect resale prices. Tose v. First Pa. Bank N.A., 648 F.2d
879, 890 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Battle v. The Lubrizol Corp., 513 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Mo.
1981) (per se rule may not apply to termination induced by single competing distributor in
absence of price-fixing motivation) (rev'don othergrounds, 42 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
563 (8th Cir. 1982)). This Article argues, however, that the per se rule should apply whenever
one distributor induces the termination of a competing distributor, regardless of whether the
elimination of price competition is a specific objective of the termination. This result is re-
quired by the Supreme Court's holding that the per se rule should apply whenever firms are
excluded from a market by their actual or potential competitors, even when price-fixing is not
a motive for the exclusion. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, despite
the precedent of the lower court decisions, a price-related motive should not be deemed a
prerequisite to the application of the per se rule when a supplier terminates a distributor as a
result of the complaints of one of the distributor's competitors.
131 See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
132 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); notes 25-27 and accom-
panying text supra. See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting), aJ'd en banc, 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
133 Under other antitrust provisions, courts have held that the party seeking to take ad-
vantage of a defense should bear the burden of proving the defense. See, e.g., Alterman Foods,
Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 450
(2d Cir. 1964); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44, 47 (7th Cir. 1963) (burden of proving
"availability" defense under § 2(d) of Robinson-Patman Act lies with defendant).
134 In other antitrust cases, a party's access to probative information has justified placing
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whether business concerns independent of the distributor's complaints
motivated a termination.
In mixed termination cases involving the appointment of exclusive
distributors or the enforcement of non-price resale restrictions, however,
the supplier is likely to have been motivated by independent business
reasons in effecting the termination. It would be unfair in such cases to
expose the supplier to the expenses and risks of a full trial when the
terminated distributor merely introduces proof of the supplier's receipt
of complaints from competing distributors. 135 To alleviate this unfair-
ness, the fact-finder should not be allowed to consider the supplier's per
se liability in such special cases unless the distributor has introduced
prima facie proof not only of a mixed termination agreement, but also of
the fact that the supplier would not have terminated the distributor but
for the agreement.
a. The Effect of Vertical Contract Restrictions. A supplier responding
to a termination conspiracy charge under section 1 may claim that the
real cause of the termination was the distributor's breach of a non-price
restriction on resale in its distribution contract with the supplier. If the
distributor has committed such a breach, there should be a presumption
that the contract violation, not the complaints of a competing distribu-
tor, caused the termination, and the burden should be shifted to the
distributor to prove that the termination was actually a response to the
complaints.
Such a presumption of vertical cause is required by the rationale of
GTE Sylvania. Under GTE Sylvania, a supplier may consider the an-
ticompetitive interests of its distributors at the time of their initial ap-
pointment.1 36 Providing intrabrand territorial protection to individual
distributors, for example, is viewed as a legitimate method of inducing
the distributors to make the type of investment in facilities and person-
nel that will allow the supplier to compete more effectively against other
brands.137 Because of these possible procompetitive interbrand effects,
vertical territorial restrictions are accorded the benefit of a full economic
the burden on the party to come forward with the information. See note 117 and accompany-
ing text sufra.
135 Several courts and commentators have concluded that in order to save suppliers from
such expenses and risks, a terminated distributor should always be required to introduce more
than circumstantial evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, ANI-
TRUST ANALYsis 560 (2d ed. 1974); notes 77-84 and accompanying text supra. Placing the
additional burden of proof on the terminated distributor, however, is only necessary in those
cases in which it appears likely that the supplier had an independent business reason for a
termination. See notes 136-53 and accompanying text injfra. In all other cases, the supplier
should have the burden of proving his independent motive for the termination. See notes 133-
34 and accompanying text sra. The suppliers ability to rebut the presumption of horizon-
tal cause should provide adequate protection against an unfair application of the per se rule
in such cases. See notes 109-18 and accompanying text supra.
136 433 U.S. at 54.
137 See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
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analysis.13 8 A supplier should not be held to have waived that benefit
when it enforces territorial restrictions by terminating a distributor fol-
lowing the receipt of complaints concerning the distributor's incursions
into other distributors' territories. 139 Such complaints do not make it
less likely that the termination was effected for procompetitive inter-
brand purposes. Because the supplier initially devised the restrictions to
meet the distributors' desires to avoid intrabrand competition, the sup-
plier would have known, even in the absence of complaints, of the dis-
tributors' concern about violations of the restrictions. With or without
the complaints, the supplier probably would have terminated the dis-
tributor for violating the resale contract restriction to prove to its dis-
tributors that it would continue to maintain the integrity of its
distribution system. Such a termination generally should be accorded a
vertical rule of reason analysis to allow consideration of the procompeti-
tive effects of inducing the remaining distributors to compete more ag-
gressively against other brands.
In some cases the terminated distributor will be able to rebut the
presumption of vertical cause by showing that its violation of a contract
restriction was not the real reason for its termination. A supplier may,
for example, terminate a distributor ostensibly for a single technical vio-
lation of a contractual provision requiring the distributor to resell prod-
ucts from a specified location. If the distributor demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the location clause in the future, the fact-finder
may conclude that complaints from other competitors about the distrib-
utor's price-cutting or other aggressive competition, not the technical
contract violations, actually provoked the termination. 140 If the termi-
nated distributor can prove that, but for the complaints, the supplier
would not have enforced the contract restriction by termination, the per
se rule should apply.
The inference of vertical cause for terminations pursuant to con-
138 See notes 40-47 and accompanying text supra.
139 When a supplier terminates a distributor to enforce the supplier's contractual rights,
it may appear more likely that the supplier acted independently of any complaining distribu-
tors. Although a supplier's contractual right to terminate a distributor is no defense to a
distributor's antitrust action, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 140 (1966),
one court has specifically noted that a termination pursuant to a contract in a mixed termina-
tion case may give rise to an inference of vertical conduct. In Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979), the court held a supplier per se liable for breaching a
distributor contract and terminating a distributor pursuant to a conspiracy with the distribu-
tor's competitor. Distinguishing Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (applying the rule of reason to a similar termination), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978),
the court pointed out that the supplier in Oreck had been within its contractual rights in
refusing to renew the plaintiff's distributorship and that such a circumstance might have
raised a greater inference of vertical conduct. 595 F.2d at 170.
140 Cf. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding of an illegal termination based in part upon the supplier's failure to discuss the possi-
bility of remedying the contractually prohibited conduct with the distributor).
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tractual resale restrictions may apply in certain instances to suppliers
who have retained the right to market their product on the resale level
in competition with their own distributors. A presumption of vertical
cause is appropriate whenever such a "dual distributor" terminates a
firm for violating restrictions that do not benefit the dual distributor in
its capacity as a reseller. 141 A dual distributor, for example, may termi-
nate a firm after receiving complaints from another distributor that the
firm was violating its distribution contract by selling in that distributor's
territory. In such a case, it would be unlikely that the firm was termi-
nated on account of its competition with the dual distributor. Further-
more, the dual distributor, like any other supplier, would be more likely
to enforce the territorial restrictions to preserve the integrity of its distri-
bution system rather than to meet the anticompetitive concerns of the
complaining distributor. Therefore, the terminated firm should have
the burden of proving that the termination would not have occurred
"but for" the complaints of the other distributor.
A presumption of horizontal cause should apply, however, when a
dual distributor terminates a firm following complaints from an entity
within the dual distributor's own organization concerning the terminat-
ed firm's competitive activities. In such cases it is more likely that the
termination was effected to prevent the terminated firm from competing
with the dual distributor.
Under the "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine, a parent and its
subsidiary may be viewed as two separate entities capable of entering
into an agreement in violation of section 1.142 Therefore, if a dual dis-
141 Cf. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.
1981) (applying rule of reason to dual distributor's termination of distributor who violated
vertical territorial and customer restrictions). But see notes 70-72 supra (cases automatically
applying per se rule to contractual resale restrictions imposed by a dual distributor without
regard to whether the dual distributor benefited from such restrictions in its resale capacity).
142 The Supreme Court has held that affiliated corporations are capable of conspiring
because they are legally distinct. See Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134 (1968) (involving parent and subsidiary); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (conspiracy among U.S. company and two of its foreign affiliates);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (corporations
under "common ownership and control" may conspire to violate Sherman Act); Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) involving parent and five wholly-
owned subsidiaries). The circuit courts, however, have disagreed over the precise limits of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The Third and Fifth Circuits have held as a matter of
law that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiaries provide the requisite plurality of actors
because they are separately incorporated. See Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20,33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equip.
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978). The Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have held, however, that the capacity of related corporations to conspire is
a question of fact that depends upon the extent to which such corporations actually carry on
their operations separately. See Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 582 (8th Cir. 1981)
("photo processing franchisor and wholly owned subsidiary constituted single economic entity
of business enterprise incapable of conspiracy"); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610
F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979) (six hotel-casinos owned or controlled by one individual did not act
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tributor carries on resale activities through a subsidiary, the parent sup-
plier may be deemed to have entered into an agreement with its
subsidiary to terminate a distributor competing with the subsidiary.' 43
The close natural ties between the parent and subsidiary would make it
easy to infer such an agreement when personnel of the subsidiary have
communicated their concern about the terminated distributor's compet-
itive activities to the management of the parent. In this situation, it is
equally likely that the parent terminated the distributor in order to re-
strict intrabrand competition with its own subsidiary rather than to pre-
serve the procompetitive interbrand effects of its vertical resale
restrictions. There is no justification, therefore, for according a pre-
sumption of vertical cause to the termination simply because of the pres-
ence of the resale restrictions. Because proof of the actual purpose of the
termination is more accessible to the dual distributor than the termi-
nated distributor, the burden of proving an independent business reason
for the termination should be on the dual distributor.14
When a termination follows complaints from a dual distributor's
own subsidiary, the fact-finder should resolve the causal issue by consid-
ering the parent and subsidiary as unrelated entities and applying the
causal analysis previously discussed. The termination will be held per se
illegal if the fact-finder concludes that the parent had no business rea-
sons independent of the anticompetitive concerns of the subsidiary for
terminating the distributor. In such a case, the anticompetitive purpose
arid effect of the termination would be no different than if the distribu-
tor had been terminated because of the complaints of an independent
distributor. If, however, the fact-finder concludes that the parent would
have terminated the distributor even in the absence of the subsidiary's
expressions of anticompetitive concern in order to enforce its contractual
resale restrictions, a vertical analysis would apply to the termination.
The dual distributor would not be denied the right to prove the reasona-
bleness of the restrictions under GTE Sylvania merely because it had re-
tained the right to market at wholesale through a subsidiary.
as separate entities), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606
F.2d 704, 727 (7th Cir. 1979) (despite separate incorporation, one company operated "more
like a corporate division than a separate corporate entity"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
Although the courts have disagreed as to the specific application of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine to related corporations, they have generally held that a corporation may not
conspire with one of its unincorporated divisions. See H & B Equip. Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417
F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967), revzd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
143 Courts have applied the intra-enterprise doctrine to find a conspiracy when a parent
and subsidiary have been involved jointly in a termination decision. See Perma-Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Minnesota Bearing Co. v.
White Motor Co., 470 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (8th Cir. 1973).
144 See notes 117 & 134 and accompanying text supra.
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b. The Eect of Exclusive Distibutorships. An inference of vertical
cause should also arise when the purpose of a mixed termination con-
spiracy is to establish or maintain an exclusive distributorship. The in-
ference of vertical cause is justified by the likelihood that the supplier
was motivated by its own business purposes rather than by the anticom-
petitive concerns of the exclusive distributor.
Courts almost uniformly have upheld refusals to deal motivated by
grants of exclusive distributorships. 145 They rarely have articulated the
rationale underlying these decisions, and the cases are generally decided
on the basis of the traditional validity of exclusive distributorships
rather than on their substantive competitive effect. Nevertheless, the
decisions appear to recognize implicitly that the establishment of an ex-
clusive distributorship usually results from a supplier's independent de-
cision concerning the general nature of its distribution system.146
Indeed, the promise of exclusive distribution rights constitutes a signifi-
cant concession to a distributor, and a supplier is not likely to grant such
an advantage without legitimate marketing reasons. The supplier may,
for example, believe that the grant of an exclusive distributorship, much
like the territorial limitations at issue in GTE Sylvania, is necessary to
induce the favored distributor to promote the supplier's product aggres-
sively.147 A supplier presumably would be willing to grant exclusive
rights only to a distributor who has demonstrated the marketing capa-
bility and willingness to represent the supplier effectively in the exclu-
sive territory.' 48 Thus, it is unlikely that a complaining distributor
could induce a supplier to terminate other distributors and appoint the
complaining distributor as an exclusive unless the supplier has in-
dependent business reasons for making the appointment. Because the
grant of an exclusive distributorship so often involves these independent
business considerations, the terminated distributor should bear the bur-
den of proving that the supplier was actually motivated by the anticom-
petitive concerns of the favored distributor in effecting the termination.
In some cases the terminated distributor may be able to prove that
the supplier's refusal to deal would not have occurred without the in-
ducement of the exclusive distributor. The distributor receiving an ex-
clusive distributorship, for example, may have complained to the
supplier about the competitive activities of other distributors and
threatened to reduce its purchases unless the distributors were termi-
nated. If the fact-finder concludes that the supplier was compelled by
the exclusive distributor's purchasing power to accede to its demands,
145 See notes 52-56 and accompanying text sup ra.
146 Set, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
147 See Del Rio Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1979);
Posner, sura note 22, at 293.
148 See Note, supra note 97, at 806-08.
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the per se rule should apply. The terminated distributors would have
been excluded from the market by one of their competitors, and the
supplier and complaining distributor should not escape per se liability
merely because their conspiracy happened to result in the establishment
of an exclusive distributorship. 149
Although this Article has focused primarily upon the application of
the causal analysis to situations involving the restriction of actual in-
trabrand competition, the analysis also applies whenpotential intrabrand
competition is affected. Exclusive distributor cases may frequently in-
volve restrictions that affect potential intrabrand competition. For ex-
ample, the supplier may replace one exclusive distributor with a new
exclusive distributor. 50 Potential intrabrand competition is restricted
by the replacement because the supplier otherwise might have allowed
both distributors to coexist in the market as non-exclusives. The hori-
zontal restriction of potential intrabrand competition justifies applica-
tion of the per se rule.' 5' Therefore, if the former exclusive distributor
can demonstrate under the causal analysis that the newly appointed ex-
clusive distributor induced its termination, the per se rule should
apply. 152
Once an exclusive distributor has been validly appointed, firms
subsequently excluded from the intrabrand market by virtue of the ap-
pointment should not be able to assert an antitrust claim against the
supplier or exclusive distributor. The exclusion of such potential compe-
tition is the natural consequence of the exclusive distribution agreement,
and the legitimacy of the exclusion derives from the validity of the
agreement itself. If, however, the supplier has granted a distributor a
lesser right than an exclusive, potential competitors excluded by reason
of the grant may have a valid antitrust claim. The supplier may, for
example, grant a distributor the right to veto the appointment of new
competitors in its territory. Whenever a distributor exercises such a veto
right to exclude a potential new distributor from the intrabrand market,
the per se rule should apply. Any supplier who presents a potential new
distributor for an existing distributor's approval would have an in-
149 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C.
Cir.) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). But see note 54 sufira (citing
cases in which courts failed to consider that an exclusive distributor's inducement of another
distributor's termination might justify use of the per se rule).
150 See note 55 supra.
151 In United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), for example, the Court
based its application of the per se rule upon the fact that supermarket chains distributing
Topco brand products had the right to determine whether additional chains would be li-
censed to distribute such products.
152 The terminated distributor would have more difficulty proving improper inducement
than in the case of a refusal to deal induced by an incumbent distributor, because the newly
appointed distributor would not have possessed any purchasing power by which to induce the
termination prior to its appointment as an exclusive.
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dependent desire to appoint the new distributor. If the existing distribu-
tor subsequently vetoed the appointment of the new distributor, it
would be clear that "but for" such action the supplier would have ap-
pointed the new distributor. Such an elimination of potential competi-
tion by the incumbent distributor would thus meet the requirements of
the causal test necessary for application of the per se rule. 53
3. Proving the Causation Issue
a. The Supplier's Case. The supplier will have the burden of prov-
ing the vertical cause of a mixed termination unless the termination in-
volves a non-price contractual resale restriction or an exclusive
distributorship. 154 This section outlines evidence that the supplier may
use to support its burden of proving that it would have terminated the
distributor even in the absence of other distributors' complaints.
Several business reasons independent of the distributors' complaints
may have motivated a supplier to terminate a distributor. The com-
plaints, for example, may have merely confirmed a prior decision made
by the supplier to simplify its distribution system by reducing the
number of distributors. 155 In order to prove that it intended to rational-
ize its overall distribution system, the supplier may have to demonstrate
that it terminated other distributors at approximately the same time.
The supplier also may argue that it decided to terminate the dis-
tributor for poor performance. Courts have frequently sustained termi-
nations of distributors for inadequate performance, stating that
suppliers have a "legitimate interest in the quality, competence, and sta-
bility" of their distributors. 156 Lack of diligence, 157 inadequate serv-
153 Some courts have found the per se rule inapplicable in veto cases on the ground that
the exercise of the veto restricted only potential intrabrand competition. See note 56 sup a.
These cases, however, appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Topco, in which
the Court found the horizontal restriction of potential intrabrand competition sufficient to
justify application of the per se rule. A few lower courts have also held the exercise of a veto
right per se illegal even though only potential intrabrand competition is affected. In Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975), the court found that
the right of Holiday Inn franchisees to veto the appointment of new franchisees in their terri-
tory was per se illegal. The court emphasized that Holiday Inn treated the incumbent fran-
chisees' objections to such appointments as "dispositive" and that the franchisees, like the
grocery chains in Topco, had the ability to determine whether potential competitors would be
appointed. 521 F.2d at 1242-43. See also Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d
466 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding complaint based on allegation that automobile distributor had
contract right to veto appointment of competing distributors); Tysons Corner Regional Shop-
ping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970, 1011 (1975) (per se illegality of right of department store under
shopping center lease to veto new department store tenants).
154 See notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra.
155 See Naifch v. Ronson Art Metal Works, 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954); Montoux v.
Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,639 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
156 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71,80 (9th Cir.
1969), cei denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
157 Gateway Bottling, Inc. v. Dad's Rootbeer Co., 53 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (de-
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ice, 15 8 dishonesty, 159 poor financial condition,' 6° and low standards. of
cleanliness and appearance' 6' have all been considered legitimate
grounds for distributor terminations. The supplier may strengthen its
case by establishing -that the distributor's poor performance constituted
a breach of specific promotional or other similar provisions in its distrib-
utor contract.
162
Evidence of the supplier's past conduct in terminating distributors
may aid it in meeting its burden of proof on the causation issue. For
example, the supplier's argument that it terminated a distributor for
poor performance might carry greater weight if it could demonstrate a
history of terminating other distributors who failed to promote the sup-
plier's product effectively. The timing of the competing distributors'
complaints may also indicate that the complaints did not cause the ter-
mination. The competing distributors may have complained regularly
for several years prior to the termination. In such a case, the supplier
may successfully argue that it disregarded the complaining distributors'
anticompetitive concerns for years and finally decided to terminate the
distributor for its own business reasons.' 63
To establish the vertical cause of a termination, the supplier may
produce evidence of the complaining distributors' inability to induce the
termination. The purchasing power of the complaining distributors, for
example, may be so small in relation to the supplier's market power as to
make it unlikely that the complaints could have induced the supplier to
terminate another distributor. Indeed, the distributors' complaints may
not even have included an express or implied threat to condition future
purchases upon another distributor's termination. In such cases it is less
likely that the supplier would have felt compelled to effect a termination
that did not coincide with its own legitimate business interests.
fault of provisions in distributor contract requiring distributor to maintain facilities and ag-
gressively promote sales).
158 Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970) (nadequate physical
facilities, personnel and past sales), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Interborough News Co. v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (upholding termination for
"real or imagined deficiencies in operation"), afd, 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955).
159 Bougeois v. A.B. Dick Co., 386 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (W.D. La. 1974) (distributor kept
erroneous records, sent manufacturer bad checks, and deposited customer checks meant for
manufacturer); Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp., 369 F. Supp. 295 (D. Colo.
1973) (distributor improperly acquired buyer's internal document and violated entertain-
ment policy of supplier).
160 See Champion Oil Serv. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 502 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
161 Wilson v. I.B.E. Indus., 510 F.2d 986, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1975).
162 Some courts have indicated that terminations pursuant to distributor contracts may
give rise to a greater inference of vertical cause in mixed termination cases. See note 139 supra.
163 In Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), the
court upheld a termination in which the competitors' complaints had been continuing for
approximately five years before the termination. See a/so Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber
Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976).
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If the supplier rebuts the inference of horizontal cause by introduc-
ing the type of evidence discussed in this section, the termination should
be viewed as vertical conduct without regard to the agreement between
the supplier and the complaining distributors. In such a case the agree-
ment would be irrelevant because the supplier would have terminated
the distributor even in the absence of the agreement. The per se rule
could then apply only if the supplier had attempted to coerce the dis-
tributor into observing certain resale prices or had terminated the dis-
tributor pursuant to a general program of resale price maintenance. 64
Provided the supplier had not effected the termination to enforce resale
price-fixing or a non-price restriction on resale in a distributor con-
tract, 165 the termination would be deemed valid under the Colgate de-
fense as a unilateral decision made by the supplier for its own business
reasons. 
166
b. The Terminated Distributor's Case. A supplier should have the
benefit of a presumption that it acted independently of distributor com-
plaints when it terminates a distributor pursuant to a non-price resale
restriction or to the grant of an exclusive distributorship. 167 This pre-
sumption is appropriate because the supplier may legitimately consider
certain anticompetitive interests of its distributors in making these deci-
sions about the general nature of its distribution system. The termi-
nated distributor, however, may still prevail by proving that its
competitors induced the supplier to effect a termination that the sup-
plier would not otherwise have considered. 168 In such a case, the per se
rule should apply because the supplier would be motivated not by the
overall objectives of its distribution system, but merely by a desire to
restrict intrabrand competition with the inducing distributors. 169 The
following are examples of the type of evidence that would help the ter-
minated distributor meet its burden of proving that the per se rule
should apply.
A terminated distributor may rebut the presumption of vertical
cause by demonstrating that the termination ran contrary to the sup-
plier's self-interest. Such a termination is more likely to have resulted
from competitors' complaints than from the supplier's independent ex-
ercise of business judgment. 70 For example, suppliers have an eco-
164 See notes 33, 42 and accompanying text sup-a.
165 See notes 34-47 and accompanying text sup'a.
166 See note 33 and accompanying text sup-a.
167 See notes 136-53 and accompanying text sup-a.
168 See notes 140, 149-53 and accompanying text supra.
i69 See id.
170 Some courts view acts contrary to a firm's economic interests as indicative of the
firm's participation in an illegal agreement. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d at 114; Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, i314
(3d Cir. 1975).
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nomic interest in stimulating a high-volume, low mark-up distribution
policy. 17 1 If a supplier acts against that interest by terminating a dis-
tributor who has successfully maintained a high resale volume, the infer-
ence may arise that other distributors coerced the supplier into effecting
the termination. 172
The terminated distributor also may demonstrate the horizontal
cause of a termination by proving that the complaining distributors
could have provided the supplier with an important marketing benefit
as consideration for the termination. For example, a supplier entering a
new market may feel compelled to placate the complaining distributors
to convince them to assume the risk of investing in a new product.
When one large distributor or a combination of several smaller distribu-
tors demands that the supplier terminate another distributor, even a
well established supplier may accede to the demands in order to retain
the distributors' business and goodwill. Any special concessions by a
complaining distributor to a supplier may also indicate horizontal cau-
sation. For example, if the complaining distributor increases its
purchases or agrees to other contract conditions favorable to the sup-
plier immediately following the termination, the fact-finder may view
this conduct as a "quid pro quo" for the termination. 173
The timing and nature of the competing distributors' complaints
may indicate that the complaints caused a distributor's termination.
The complaints may concern competitive conduct such as price-cutting,
for example, which is more likely to be of concern to the complaining
distributors than to the supplier. 174 A termination following receipt of
such complaints gives rise to a greater inference of horizontal cause. A
similar inference may arise when a termination occurs immediately fol-
lowing a supplier's receipt of complaints about a distributor who, by all
outward appearances, had been performing satisfactorily. 175 If the sup-
171 The GTE-Sylvania Court cited this interest in support of its conclusion that, in at-
tempting to promote interbrand competition, suppliers would also attempt to retain as much
intrabrand competition as possible. 433 U.S. at 55-56. See Pitofsky, supra note 22, at 10;
Posner, supra note 22, at 283. But see Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions:
White Motor andIts Afjtkmath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1425-27 (1968) (manufacturer and
retailer benefit from restricted intrabrand competition through higher markups).
172 See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d at 123-24 (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting). But see Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir. 1972) (no inference
of anticompetitive intent from fact that terminated distributor had high resale volume); Bay
City-Abrahams Bros., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206, 1215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
173 See South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (dicta).
174 It is in the supplier's economic interest to retain low-price, high-volume distributors.
See notes 171-72 and accompanying text supra.
175 See Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1979) ("sudden
repudiation of a recently made" distributor agreement indicates that pressure from another
customer may have caused the termination); cf. Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel
Gas Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,780 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding indication of illegal
conspiracy from fact that buyer refused, within three days of contact by natural gas producer,
to purchase gas from competing producer).
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plier never expressed dissatisfaction with the distributor before the ter-
mination, it is more likely that the termination was directly related to
the complaints. 176
The supplier's treatment of other distributors may reveal that the
supplier would not have considered a distributor's contract violation se-
rious enough to justify termination in the absence of complaints from
the distributor's competitors. For example, the supplier may not have
terminated other distributors who had previously engaged in similar
conduct.' 77 The supplier may even have singled out the distributor for
termination while retaining distributors whose conduct was indistin-
guishable from that of the terminated distributor.178
The supplier's treatment of the distributor during their contractual
relationship may also indicate that the contract violation allegedly moti-
vating the refusal to deal was not in fact of great concern to the supplier.
If the supplier had failed to provide a contractual right of termination
for the violation in question, a court might conclude that the supplier
did not consider the contract provision critical to the distribution ar-
rangement. The supplier also may not have informed the distributor
that such a violation could lead to termination 179 and may not have
allowed the distributor an opportunity to remedy the violation.'8 0 In
such cases, the fact-finder may conclude that the breach of a vertical
contract provision was not considered to be serious by the supplier and
was only an excuse for terminating the distributor to satisfy the com-
plaints of competitors.
Internal memoranda or other documents indicating that the parties
bargained for a termination provide the best evidence of horizontal
cause. Written reports of calls on competing distributors by the sup-
plier's salesmen may reveal that a distributor threatened to condition
176 Cf. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. Supp. 735, 762-63 (D. Md. 1975)
(illegal resale price maintenance demonstrated when supplier who had not previously indi-
cated dissatisfaction with distributor terminated the distributor immediately following dis-
tributor's complaint about resale price coercion).
177 Se Mendel Schwimmer d/b/a/ Supersonic Elecs. Co. v. Sony Corp. of America,
1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (jury could infer that competitors' com-
plaints caused termination when supplier had not previously terminated a distributor for
failure to repay advertising credits), revld, 1982 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 64,724 (2d Cir.
1982).
178 See Bartlit, supra note 3, at 320-21.
179 In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), GM argued that it
should not be liable for terminating dealers who dealt with discounters, because such conduct
violated the location clauses in the dealers' franchise agreements. Rejecting the argument,
the Court pointed out that GM had never informed its dealers that such conduct violated the
franchise agreements and had never announced that the dealers might be terminated for such
conduct. 384 U.S. at 139, 143.
180 In Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the
court based its finding of an illegal termination in part upon the suppliers failure to give the
terminated distributor an opportunity to explain the customer complaints that were the al-
leged reason for the termination.
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future purchases upon another distributor's termination. Internal mem-
oranda of the supplier may indicate that distributors' complaints about
a competitor were forwarded to senior management and seriously con-
sidered at that level.' 8 ' Given the present sophistication of antitrust
compliance programs, however, it is unlikely that any such documents
will be completely dispositive of the causation issue.182
If the terminated distributor proves by use of the type of evidence
discussed in this section that the supplier would not have terminated the
distributor but for the complaints of competing distributors, the per se
rule should apply even if an exclusive distributorship or non-price resale
restriction is involved. Such a result is appropriate because any termi-
nation induced by competing distributors can have no purpose other
than the restriction of intrabrand competition.'83
V
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
The advantages of the analysis proposed in this Article are best il-
lustrated by application to the following hypothetical case. Assume that
Supplier has appointed Distributor A and Distributor B as competing
distributors in a particular territory. Distributor A is a large, long-term
customer of Supplier who has made a substantial investment in facilities
and personnel to promote Supplier's product. Distributor B carries on a
small, low overhead operation, has only recently begun to carry Sup-
plier's product, and is not yet a significant factor in the market for Sup-
plier's product. Distributor A complains to Supplier that Distributor B
has been cutting the price for Supplier's product and has thereby di-
verted potential customers from Distributor A. Three months later,
Supplier terminates Distributor B and appoints Distributor A as an ex-
clusive distributor in the territory. Given its insignificant market share,
Distributor B cannot allege that its termination unreasonably restricted
competition in the relevant market for Supplier's product. Distributor
B does, however, bring an action against Supplier and Distributor A,
alleging a conspiracy to exclude it from the market that constituted a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. In its complaint Distributor B al-
leges that an illegal conspiracy can be inferred from Supplier's receipt of
Distributor A's complaints and subsequent termination of Distributor B.
Under the approach currently employed by several lower federal
courts, Distributor B's claim could be dismissed in a summary judgment
action on any of the following grounds: (1) the allegation of Supplier's
receipt of Distributor A's complaints is insufficient prima facie proof of a
181 See Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1963).
182 Pitofsky, supra note 22, at 35.
183 See notes 14-30 and accompanying text supra.
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conspiracy;18 4 (2) the per se rule cannot apply to the termination be-
cause the alleged conspiracy lacks horizontal plurality;18 5 or (3) the per
se rule is inapplicable because Supplier established an exclusive
distributorship. 1 86
Under the proposed analysis, the fact-finder would have a greater
opportunity to review the competitive substance of the alleged conspir-
acy. Distributor B could establish a prima facie case of conspiracy by
showing that Distributor A complained to Supplier about Distributor
B's price-cutting, that Supplier's top management received the com-
plaints immediately prior to the termination, and that the complaints
carried the implied request that Distributor B be terminated. 87 - The
fact-finder could then consider whether Supplier and Distributor A had
reached a meeting of the minds on Distributor B's termination. If the
fact-finder concludes that such a conspiracy existed, it would then con-
sider the causation issue and determine whether the per se rule might
apply because Supplier had undertaken the termination not for its own
business reasons but to satisfy the anticompetitive concerns of Dis-
tributor A.
The per se rule would not be deemed automatically inapplicable
merely because the conspiracy lacks horizontal plurality or happens to
involve the appointment of an exclusive distributor. In order to protect
Supplier against undue litigation costs and delays, however, Supplier
would have the benefit of a presumption that in terminating Distributor
B and appointing Distributor A as an exclusive, it was motivated by
independent concerns about the overall nature of its distribution sys-
tem. 88 To avoid summary judgment or a directed verdict, Distributor
B would therefore have to rebut the presumption by introducing evi-
dence that Supplier would not have terminated Distributor B "but for"
the complaints of Distributor A. Distributor B might meet this burden
by producing evidence that it had been purchasing increasing volumes
of product from Supplier and that Supplier consequently had acted
against its own economic interests in effecting the termination, 8 9 that
internal memoranda of Supplier or Distributor A indicated that Sup-
plier had seriously considered a threat by Distributor A to reduce its
purchases significantly if Supplier did not terminate Distributor B,190 or
184 See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
185 See notes 59-68 and accompanying text sura.
186 e notes 52-58 and accompanying text sura.
187 See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
188 See notes 145-49 and accompanying text supra. If, however, Supplier had not estab-
lished an exclusive, Supplier would have the burden of rebutting the inference that the termi-
nation was caused by Supplier's agreement with Distributor A. See notes 133-34 and
accompanying text sura.
189 See notes 170-72 and accompanying text rupra.
190 See notes 181-82 and accompanying text supra.
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that prior to the receipt of Distributor A's complaints Supplier had
given no indication that it was considering terminating Distributor B
and appointing Distributor A as an exclusive. 191 If Distributor B in-
troduces any such evidence rebutting the presumption of vertical cause,
the fact-finder would weigh the conflicting evidence and determine
whether Supplier was motivated by Distributor A's price-cutting com-
plaints or by its own independent business judgment in effecting the
termination.
If the fact-finder holds in favor of Distributor B on both the con-
spiracy issue and the causation issue, the termination will be deemed per
se illegal. In such a case, Distributor B would have been excluded from
the market by virtue of the actions of Distributor A, a direct competitor.
Because a termination induced by Distributor A would not promote in-
terbrand competition and would have as its only purpose the elimina-
tion of intrabrand competition, the per se rule would be appropriate. 192
If the fact-finder concludes either that no conspiracy existed be-
tween Supplier and Distributor A or that, although the parties were
both committed to the termination, Supplier terminated Distributor B
for business reasons independent of Distributor A's price-cutting con-
cerns, the termination will be analyzed as vertical conduct. The termi-
nation would be valid under Colgate as a unilateral action by Supplier
unless Distributor B could demonstrate that the termination constituted
an attempt by Supplier to coerce Distributor B into adhering to certain
resale prices. 193
CONCLUSION
The analysis proposed in this Article provides a practical method
for courts to determine whether a horizontal or vertical approach is ap-
propriate when a distributor has allegedly been terminated pursuant to
a conspiracy between its supplier and one or more of its competitors. 194
191 See notes 175-76 and accompanying text supra.
192 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text supra.
193 See note 33 and accompanying text suira. Distributor B would probably not prevail
in a claim alleging that Supplier effected the termination to enforce a resale price restriction
because the fact-finder would previously have concluded that Supplier was not motivated by
Distributor A's price-cutting complaints. If Supplier had terminated Distributor B to en-
force territorial or other non-price vertical restrictions in a distribution contract between Sup-
plier and Distributor B, Distributor B would have to demonstrate that the contract
restrictions were invalid under the rule of reason. See notes 34-47 and accompanying text
ufira.
194 This Article has analyzed mixed conspiracies which result .in the termination of a
distributor. The proposed analysis may also apply, however, when a complaining distributor
induces a supplier to impose restraints other than a termination upon a competing distribu-
tor. If, for example, the "but for" test indicates that certain distributors induced a supplier
only to sell to a competing distributor at a discriminatorily high price, to require the distribu-
tor to observe certain territorial or customer restrictions, or to impose other disadvantageous
resale restrictions on the distributor, the conditions imposed by the supplier should be ana-
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By separating the issue of conspiracy from the issue of cause, the analysis
ensures that the fact-finder will consider the questions of competitive
purpose and intent necessary for a fair and consistent application of the
per se rule, the rule of reason, and the Colgate defense. The analysis thus
avoids the inconsistencies and inequities of the formalistic approach
adopted by the lower federal courts in many mixed termination cases. 195
lyzed as horizontal conduct. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Web-
ster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966). If one or more competing distributors
induce the supplier to impose such conditions, there is no more justification for viewing the
supplier's conduct as vertical than in the termination cases discussed in this Article.
The proposed analysis may also apply when only potential competition is affected. As
pointed out in the case of exclusive distributorships, the analysis may apply either when a
potential distributor induces a supplier to terminate an incumbent distributor, see notes 150-
52 and acompanying text supra, or when an incumbent distributor induces a supplier not to
deal with a potential distributor, see note 153 and accompanying text supra. In each case,
potential intrabrand competition is eliminated, and Topco requires that the per se rule be
applied if the "but for" test is met.
195 See notes 49-87 and accompanying text supra.
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